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I. INTRODUCTION 
The inequitable conduct doctrine governs a patent applicant's duties 
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). The 
doctrine requires the inventor to disclose information to the USPTO that is 
relevant to the patentability-the utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and 
adequate disclosure-of the invention at issue. 1 The doctrine is pervasive, 
imposing a duty to disclose and be truthful in every correspondence with 
the USPTO. 
The penalty for failing to discharge this duty is dramatic-coined an 
"atomic bomb" by one Federal Circuit judge. 2 A finding of inequitable 
conduct renders the entire patent unenforceable for the rest of the patent 
term, even when the undisclosed information was material to only a par-
ticular patent claim. 3 In some cases, the doctrine extends its reach to re-
lated patents, rendering them unenforceable as well. 4 The resulting unen-
forceability persists even if the invention actually meets the patent re-
quirements. 5 The nature of the inequitable conduct doctrine makes it 
unique in patent law, in that it is an individual's failure to disclose-rather 
than an inherent trait of the claimed invention-that results in the denial of 
protection for the invention and other related patents. 
Given the all-encompassing nature of the inequitable conduct doctrine 
and its death-penalty-like remedy, it is not surprising that the doctrine has 
garnered much attention and criticism since its inception. The Federal Cir-
cuit has gone out of its way on more than one occasion to criticize aspects 
of the doctrine. 6 There has been a tremendous amount of recent activity at 
1. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (setting 
forth the three basic elements of inequitable conduct-materiality, non-disclosure, and 
intent); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2008) (describing the type of information a patent applicant is 
under a duty to disclose). 
2. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
3. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en bane) ("When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct 
occurred in relation to one or more claims during prosecution of the patent application, 
the entire patent is rendered unenforceable."). 
4. If there is a pattern of inequitable conduct, unenforceability can transfer from 
one patent to another. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 
812 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
5. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that "the penalty for inequitable conduct is so severe, the loss of 
the entire patent even where every claim clearly meets every requirement of patentabili-
ty"). 
6. Judges on the court have characterized the doctrine as "overplayed," Kimberly-
Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and labeled its 
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the Federal Circuit regarding the proper strength of the doctrine, resulting 
in enough of a conflict to prompt two judges over a five-month period to 
draft dissents addressing the doctrine in general. 7 One Federal Circuit 
judge recentll expressly called for reconsideration of the doctrine by the 
whole court. Patent practitioners constantly monitor and critique the de-
velopment of the doctrine, partly because it focuses on "the person rather 
than the patent."9 This attention by both judiciary and bar spurred two ma-
jor patent system studies to discuss possible modifications to the inequita-
ble conduct doctrine. 10 One study went so far as to suggest the elimination 
of the doctrine altogether. 11 Congress has also begun to pay attention, with 
essentially every draft of its recent patent reform legislation containing 
some amendment to the doctrine. 12 Even the USPTO has suggested rule 
changes that would affect the doctrine. 13 
Every facet of the patent system-Congress, the Federal Circuit, the 
USPTO, and patent practitioners-is concerned about the state of the ine-
quitable conduct doctrine. No consensus exists, however, as to what is 
wrong with the doctrine and how it should be changed. As a result, the dis-
habitual assertion in litigation as "an absolute plague," Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco 
Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
7. See Praxair, Inc v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1329-31 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Lou-
rie, J., dissenting); Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
8. See Larson Mfg. Co. of S. Dakota, Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 
1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 18, 2009) (Linn., J., concurring) (concluding that the recent 
inequitable conduct precedent "has significantly diverged from the Supreme Court's 
treatment of inequitable conduct" and "the time has come for the court to review the issue 
en bane"). 
9. Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent 
Procurement: A Nutshell, a Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Mod-
est Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277,279 (1997). 
10. See Fed. Trade Comm'n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Com-
petition and Patent Law and Policy 12-13 (2003), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/ 10/innovationrpt.pdf; Nat'l Research Council, A Patent System 
for the 21st Century 121-23 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004). 
11. See NAT' L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 123. 
12. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 11 Oth Con g. § 123 (2007); Pa-
tent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, 
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 136 (2005). 
The 2009 legislative draft pending before the Senate does not contain any inequitable 
conduct language. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111 th Cong. (2009). Senator 
Orin Hatch, however, is still pushing for inequitable conduct reform to be included in the 
legislation. See 155 CONG. REC. S2715 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009) (statement of S. Hatch). 
13. See Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Re-
lated Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
(proposing to change the IDS requirements to include relevancy statements, in addition to 
other requirements). 
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jointed discussion has created inconsistency at the legislative level-with 
reform proposals driven by whichever critique Congress is focused on in a 
0 0 
gtven sessiOn. 
Running in parallel with the conversation about the inequitable con-
duct doctrine is a broader discussion of patent quality. One of the major 
focuses of the patent reform movement is to ensure that the USPTO issues 
only those patents that claim truly patentable inventions. 14 The number of 
patent applications is rising exponentially, the time a patent examiner can 
spend examining them is decreasing, and the quality of patent applications 
and the information available for examination is dropping. 15 All of these 
factors cause more patents to issue that, in actuality, should not be issued. 
The resulting "bad" patents-patents that fail to meet the patentability re-
quirements-are harmful, creating detrimental societal costs via hold-ups 
and the in terrorem effects that invalid patents create. 16 
These two topics-the inequitable conduct doctrine and patent reform 
in general-are being addressed with increasing frequency by academics. 
Academics have written articles on the patent examination process, ways 
to reform it, and the negative impact of issuing bad patents. 17 Likewise, 
many scholars have written articles specifically on the inequitable conduct 
doctrine. 18 However, this scholarship has failed to fully link these two 
areas. As a result, it has failed to engage in two basic, interrelated exercis-
es that would greatly assist the discourse on the inequitable conduct doc-
trine and patent reform in general. 
First, no one has attempted a comprehensive, theoretical analysis of 
how the inequitable conduct doctrine as a whole affects patent applicants, 
14. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the 
Patent System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 270, 276-78 
(2007) ("In the last few years, widespread dissatisfaction with the patent system--and 
particularly with the perceived poor quality of issued patents--has spurred a broad range 
of groups to call for reform."). 
15. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption 
of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REv. 45, 46-47 (2007) (identifying these problems as the cause 
of the USPTO's "mistakes" while reviewing patent applications). 
16. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid 
Patents, 91 MINN. L. REv. 101, 113 (2006) ("[S]ome invalid patents can deter market 
entry and decrease consumer welfare even without active enforcement."). 
17. See, e.g., John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: 
A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 305 (2001) ("By awarding 
prior art informants with a bounty assessed against applicants, the Patent Office can re-
store order to the patent system and reduce its social costs."). 
18. See, e.g., Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in 
Patent Litigation, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37 (1993) (tracing "the development of the law 
concerning inequitable conduct from the beginning of the patent system"). 
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patent examination, and potential inventors. 19 Performing a fundamental 
analysis of the doctrine would provide a framework by which proposed 
changes could be tested. Such an analysis would also flesh out how the 
doctrine plays a significant role in the patent system overall. 
Second, and related, almost all of the scholarship on the inequitable 
conduct doctrine has kept the discussion tied to its equitable roots, focus-
ing on the doctrine as an ethical tool. 20 These discussions are of little help 
when the specific criticisms of the doctrine are not morally focused. Fur-
thermore, any proposed change to the doctrine needs to be considered in 
the context of broader reforms rooted in the utilitarian theory that under-
lies American intellectual property law. Thinking on the inequitable con-
duct doctrine needs to be modernized and framed in the same utilitarian 
terms that form the foundation for the patent system. This Article attempts 
to fill these scholarly holes and answer the question as to how the doctrine 
should be changed and used to improve the patent system. 
This Article's main finding is that the inequitable conduct doctrine has 
the ability to improve patent quality as long as the inherent tendency to 
overcomply with the doctrine by overloading the USPTO with information 
is kept in check. The Article reaches this conclusion by proceeding in five 
parts. Part II describes the current thinking on the inequitable conduct doc-
trine, with particular focus on the major critiques of the doctrine and pro-
posed legislative and administrative responses. Part III of the Article be-
gins the construction of a fundamental, conceptual framework for the doc-
trine by explaining how it impacts both patent quality and patent examina-
tion. If properly calibrated, the doctrine can improve both the quality of 
the patent application (by increasing the patent attorney's knowledge and 
19. A majority of the articles are sound, but focus on specific parts of the doctrine, 
particular proposed statutory changes and individual Federal Circuit cases. See, e.g., Da-
vid Hricik, Where the Bodies Are: Current Exemplars of Inequitable Conduct and How to 
Avoid Them, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 287, 289 (2004) (discussing, in detail, the vari-
ous fact patterns that have supported a finding of inequitable conduct); James Cronin, 
Comment, Inequitable Conduct and the Standard of Materiality: Why the Federal Circuit 
Should Use the Reasonable Patent Examiner Standard, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1327 (2006) 
(discussing the materiality requirement of the inequitable conduct doctrine). 
20. One commentator even affirmatively dismissed the linkage between the doctrine 
and patent quality, concluding that reforms should focus on "punishing bad behavior on 
the part of applicants." Cronin, supra note 19, at 1360. Articles have mentioned the doc-
trine's possible impact on patent quality. See, e.g., Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Ine-
quitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 147, 166-69 (2006). These articles mention this linkage only in passing, fail-
ing to fully develop the discussion conceptually. For example, no article has discussed 
the huge potential for over compensation under the doctrine, a significant aspect of the 
doctrine's impact on patent quality developed in this Article. See infra Parts IV, V. 
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care) and the quality of the examination (by acting as an information pro-
ducer and verifier). 
The doctrine's potential impact is not all positive. The tremendous in-
centive for applicants to overcomply can actually decrease patent quality. 
Part IV completes the conceptual framework by detailing how the doc-
trine, through the extreme legal and extra-legal costs it currently imposes, 
incentivizes inventors and, in particular, patent attorneys to overcomply by 
submitting all information, regardless of relevance, to the USPTO. Part V 
explains how this overcompliance negatively affects patent examination 
and the patent system by causing information overload that hampers the 
USPTO's ability to operate effectively and by creating high compliance 
costs that price inventors out of the patent system. Finally, in Part VI, the 
Article uses this framework to suggest changes that maintain the positive 
effects of the doctrine on patent quality while minimizing overcompliance. 
II. CURRENT THINKING ON THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
DOCTRINE 
Before a conceptual framework regarding the inequitable conduct doc-
trine can be developed, the basic process of obtaining a patent, the current 
contours of the inequitable conduct doctrine, and the debate surrounding it 
need to be detailed. This Part begins with a description of the patent pros-
ecution process. It then details the three requirements of the inequitable 
conduct doctrine-materiality, disclosure, and intent-and available re-
medies. This Part concludes by describing the popular critiques of the doc-
trine, the proposed legislative responses, and the major disconnects in this 
discourse. Those familiar with the patenting process and the inequitable 
conduct doctrine can skip directly to Section II.C. 
A. Basics of Patent Prosecution 
To patent an invention in the United States, an inventor must file a pa-
tent application with the USPTO. The patent application contains a textual 
and graphical description of the invention called the specification. The 
specification includes general statements regarding the technical back-
ground of the invention, the problem it is trying to solve, and some specif-
ic examples-embodiments--of the invention. 21 The patent application 
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. I (2006) (reciting the written description, enable-
ment, and best mode requirements for the specification); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent 
Claim Interpretation and Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 57, 68-69 (2005) 
(discussing the various kinds of information patent law requires the inventor put in the 
patent's specification); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71, 1.77(b) (2008) (indicating the various types of 
information the specification should include). 
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also includes a set of claims. Each claim is a single sentence that defines 
the exact invention the inventor wishes to protect. 22 The application can 
either be filed by the inventor herself or by a patent attorney or a~ent, who 
must be a member of the USPTO bar and represents the inventor. 3 
Once filed, the application is given to a patent examiner assigned to 
the invention's technological area. The examiner reviews each claim to 
determine whether it meets the requirements for patentability-whether 
the claim defines an invention that is useful, novel, and nonobvious, and 
whether the specification adequately describes and enables the claimed 
invention. 24 To make this determination, the examiner must first gain an 
understanding of the exact scope of the claims. From there, the examiner 
searches for information-referred to as "prior art"-that might render the 
claims invalid. 25 This information can come in many forms, such as scien-
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 2; Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 339 (1961) ("[T]he claims made in the patent are the sole measure of 
the grant .... "); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies 
and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 49, 61-62 (2005). 
23. 37 C.F.R. § 1.31 (2008). For the purposes of this Article, patent attorneys and 
patent agents, those who are members of the USPTO bar but not lawyers, are referred to 
collectively as "patent attorneys." Most patent applicants are represented by patent attor-
neys or patent agents-few go "prose." See Martin B. Schwimmer, Domain Names and 
Everything Else: Trademark Issues in Cyberspace, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC TRADE-
MARK LAW 1998, at 263, 268 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., 
Course Handbook Series No. G0-001S, 1998) ("Finally, the 'constituency' of the PTO, 
namely patent and trademark applicants, are represented, for the most part, by attorneys 
who, as members of bar committees, communicate with the PTO."). 
24. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 112 (2006) (setting forth the requirements for patentabil-
ity); 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(c) (2008). 
The USPTO is currently forced to examine applications under extreme time con-
straints and in the face of a significant backlog of pending applications. See Eric B. Chen, 
Conflicting Objectives: The Patent Office's Quality Review Initiative and the Examiner 
Count System, 10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 28, 30 (2009) ("Despite this success, several chal-
lenges continue to plague the USPTO, namely the backlog of unexamined patent applica-
tions, concerns over examiner attrition, and the increasing volume of continuing applica-
tions .... "). This situation leads to long delays between the filing of a patent application 
and an examiner's action on that application. See Gary C. Ganzi, Patent Continuation 
Practice and Public Notice: Can They Coexist?, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 
545, 563 (2007) ("However, with present application pendency delays, a typical patent 
application does not usually even receive the benefit of a first examiner office action at 
the USPTO within the publication time of eighteen months after filing."). These circums-
tances have import for later analysis in this Article. See infra Section liLA. 
25. Information relevant to examination, while described in all subsections of 35 
U.S.C. § 102 (2006), falls into two basic categories, both defining the universe of "prior 
art." The first set of prior art is that information produced by those other than the inventor 
prior to the date of the invention. See, e.g.,§ 102(a). The second is art produced by any-
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tific articles, general publications, other United States patents or patents 
issued by other countries, and general public knowledge or use. 26 
The applicant can submit potential prior art to the USPTO. Such art 
may be cited in the background section of the patent application to give 
context to the claimed invention. 27 The information is usually submitted 
via an information disclosure statement ("IDS"). 28 Depending on the tim-
ing of the submission of the IDS, the applicant may have to request anoth-
er round of examination to give the examiner time to consider the submit-
ted information. 29 
The examiner compares the prior art to the application's claims to de-
termine whether the claims are novel and nonobvious. 30 The examiner al-
so looks to see if the specification adequately describes and enables the 
claimed invention. 31 Based on the results of this initial examination, the 
examiner issues an "office action" to the applicant describing the examin-
er's findings and identifying which claims she believes to be and not to be 
patentable and the reasons for this conclusion. 32 
one-including the inventor-more than one year before the patent application's filing. 
See, e.g.,§ 102(b). 
26. See, e.g., § 1 02( a )-(b) (detailing these different types of prior art). 
27. 37 C.F.R. § 1.77(e) (2008). 
28. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.97, 1.98 (2008) (detailing the filing procedure of an IDS and its 
content). Prior art may also be disclosed in the patent specification itself. See, e.g., 37 
C.F.R. § 1.71(b) (2008) (indicating that applicant should distinguish her invention "from 
what is old"). 
29. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.98(b)-(d) (listing the timing requirements for filing a proper 
IDS); 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006) (establishing a method for continuing examination-a 
request for continued examination ("RCE")). 
30. The examiner looks to see if the claims have already been disclosed in the prior 
art-that is, whether they are not novel or statutorily barred. See 35 U.S.C. § 102; In re 
Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("A rejection for anticipation under 
section 102 requires that each and every limitation of the claimed invention be disclosed 
in a single prior art reference."). The examiner also looks to see if pieces of the prior art 
would have been combined together to duplicate an application's claim-that is, whether 
the claim is obvious. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 
U.S. 398, 405 (2007). The Court in KSR stated: 
!d. 
Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when 'the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the 
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 
to which said subject matter pertains.' 
31. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2006); In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
32. 35 U.S.C. § 151 (2006)(detailing the issuance of a patent). 
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The applicant responds to the office action by rebutting the examiner's 
analysis, amending the patent's claims to overcome the examiner's objec-
tions, or canceling patent claims altogether. 33 The examiner then reviews 
the applicant's response and either agrees and allows the claims or does 
not and maintains the rejections. The examination ends when either some 
of the patent claims are allowed or the patent is abandoned altogether. 
Once a patent is issued, it may be used to exclude others from practicing 
the claimed invention. 34 The patent claims that the USPTO concludes are 
patentable enjoy a strong presumption of meeting the patentability stan-
dards, requiring a challen~er to prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the claims are invalid. 5 
This whole process is secret, with the application and the correspon-
dence only being publicly disclosed when and if the patent issues (or 
sooner if the applicant so elects). 36 The process is ex parte with the ex-
aminer representing the public's interest and is meant to be non-
adversarial. 37 The public may comment on or submit art relating to a 
pending application, 38 but these options are rarely used. 39 This makes the 
patent examiner, the reviewing authorities within the USPTO, and the re-
viewing courts incredibly important to the patent process. They are essen-
33. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a) (2006) (noting that examination continues when "the appli-
cant persists in his claim for a patent, with or without amendment"). 
34. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006). 
35. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006); Am. Seating Co. v. USSC Group, Inc., 514 F.3d 
1262, 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting that the presumption of validity can be overcome 
with only "clear and convincing evidence"). This strong presumption makes examination 
incredibly important. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 15, at 47 (concluding that the 
presumption makes "issuance mistakes hard to reverse"). 
36. The application, and all related correspondence, is published eighteen months 
after filing, unless the applicant requests no such publication. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2006). 
37. See Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 152 (D. Del. 1977) ("The 
prosecution of an application before the Patent Office is not an adversary, but an ex parte 
proceeding."). The USPTO even views patent applicants as "customers." See ADAM B. 
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT 
SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 11, 
20 (2004). 
38. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (2008) (describing the protest procedure and allowing 
prior art to be filed along with a protest). 
39. Andrew Kopelman, Note, Addressing Questionable Business Method Patents 
Prior to Issuance: A Two-Part Proposal, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2391, 2413-14 (2006) 
(indicating that most do not use the protest mechanism because it is difficult to discover a 
pending application). 
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tially the only gatekeepers to the initial and very important determination 
that an invention is worthy of twenty years of exclusivity. 40 
B. Requirements of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine 
The current inequitable conduct doctrine is judicially-created and im-
pacts the entire patent prosecution process. The doctrine focuses on the 
patent application and related correspondence between the applicant and 
the USPTO during patent prosecution. It is comprised of three basic ele-
ments: materiality, intent, and disclosure. Specific remedies accompany a 
finding of inequitable conduct. 
1. Materiality 
The doctrine focuses on the disclosure of material information. Infor-
mation is material if it is relevant to the patentability of the claimed inven-
tion being examined. 41 The standard for materiality is articulated in a 
USPTO regulation, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (Rule 56). 42 The most recent version 
of Rule 56 deems information material if 
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other 
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a 
claim; or (2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position 
the applicant takes in: (i) Opposing an argument of 
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2006) (granting authority to the USPTO to examine appli-
cations and issue patents); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2006) (giving the Federal Circuit 
appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the Board of Appeals and Patent Interferences 
(BPAI)); 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2006) (authorizing the appeal from a final rejection to the 
BPAI). An applicant can, instead of appealing to the Federal Circuit, appeal a BPAI rul-
ing to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, whose decision is 
then appealed to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2006). 
41. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) ("For many years this court held that materiality for purposes of an inequitable 
conduct determination required a showing that 'a reasonable examiner would have consi-
dered such prior art important in deciding whether to allow the parent application.'"). !d. 
at 1362 ("Information did not need to be prior art in order to be material, but 'instead 
embrace[d] any information that a reasonable examiner would substantially likely con-
sider important in deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent."') ( quot-
ing Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998)). 
42. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
("In evaluating materiality, this court has consistently referred to the standard set forth in 
PTO Rule 56."); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008). Rule 56 does not supplant the materiality 
standard articulated by the courts, it merely informs the standard. See Digital Control Inc. 
v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309,1314-16 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii) 
an argument of patentability. 43 
Asserting 
The materiality standard does not create a "but for" test, in which the 
information needs be disclosed only if it would actually render a pending 
patent claim invalid. 44 Instead, materiality is broader, requiring disclosure 
of information that would merely establish a prima facie case of invalidity 
that may be rebuttable. 45 
2. Intent 
The non-disclosure of material information must be intentional to rise 
to the level of inequitable conduct. 46 An omission or misrepresentation of 
material information is considered intentional if the applicant actually in-
tended to deceive or mislead the USPT0. 47 Gross negligence is not 
enough. 48 Circumstantial evidence can be used to prove the relevant par-
ty's intent. 49 
43. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b). This new standard, compared to the earlier "reasonable ex-
aminer" standard, "was not intended to constitute a significant substantive break with the 
previous standard." Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1368 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
44. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362-63 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (dismissing an objective "but for" test that would have required a prere-
quisite finding of invalidity to establish materiality). 
45. See Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
46. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 1369, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) ("[T]he trial court must also determine whether the evidence shows a threshold 
level of intent to mislead the PTO."). 
47. See Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
("Even if an omission is found to be material, the omission must also be found to have 
been made with the intent to deceive."). 
48. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (en bane). The Federal Circuit noted: 
We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to 
'gross negligence' does not of itself justify an inference of intent to 
deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, 
including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient 
culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive. 
!d. at 876. 
49. See Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Lemmon Co., 906 F.2d 684, 688 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). The use of circumstantial evidence is one of the main areas of recent disagreement 
amongst Federal Circuit judges. Intent needs to be independently proven. See Star Scien-
tific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[W]e 
have emphasized that 'materiality does not presume intent, which is a separate and essen-
tial component of inequitable conduct."'). And many agree that finding direct evidence is 
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3. Disclosure 
The doctrine requires the disclosure of material information. 50 A fail-
ure to disclose can occur in two instances-by omission or misrepresenta-
tion. 51 Omission is where the patentee fails to disclose material informa-
tion in her filings with the USPTO. The typical non-disclosure by omis-
sion situation involves an applicant who fails to submit information which 
is in her possession, qualifies as prior art, and is material to one or more of 
the application's claims. 52 Misrepresentation, in contrast, occurs when the 
patentee does disclose information to the USPTO, but misrepresents a ma-
terial aspect of the disclosed information. 53 Misrepresentation can also be 
very unlikely. Id. Therefore, the question becomes what evidence is proper circumstantial 
evidence of intent, id., and how does a court weigh such circumstantial evidence. Com-
pare id. at 1366-67 (noting that a finding of intent based on circumstantial evidence must 
be "the single most reasonable inference"), with Praxair, Inc v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 
1306, 1315 (2008) (stating that intent can be inferred if materiality is high, the applicant 
knew or should have known of the materiality, and the applicant failed to "come forward 
with any credible good faith explanation" for nondisclosure). This dispute over the stan-
dard for intent is important for the prescriptive portion of this Article. See infra Section 
VI.A.2. 
!d. 
50. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2008). The regulation provides: 
Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent 
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the 
Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information 
known to that individual to be material to patentability as defined in 
this section. 
51. See Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
("[I]nequitable conduct includes affirmative misrepresentation of a material fact, failure 
to disclose material information, or submission of false material information, coupled 
with an intent to deceive." (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1178 
(Fed. Cir. 1995))). 
52. The failure to submit an earlier chemistry report and previous test data indicat-
ing that a prior canola oil formulation exhibited similar properties to the claimed canola 
oil formula is an example of material non-disclosure. Cargill, Inc. v. Can bra Foods, Ltd., 
476 F.3d 1359, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
53. The facts of Frazier v. Roessel Cine Photo Tech, Inc., 417 F.3d 1230 (Fed. Cir. 
2005), provide a good example of a material misrepresentation. The patent at issue in 
Frazier claimed a "Z lens" that provided for an increased depth of field-allowing both a 
close-up object and a distance background to both appear in focus at the same time. Id. at 
1234-36. During prosecution, the applicant submitted a videotape to help demonstrate 
the superiority of the invention over the prior art. Id. This submission was deemed a ma-
terial misrepresentation because some of the most striking examples of depth of field in 
the video were from the unlabeled use of a "L-shaped lens," not the claimed Z lens. !d. 
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more blatant, with the application simply submitting false information to 
the USPTO. 54 Again, there is disclosure, but the truth is not disclosed. 
The inequitable conduct doctrine does not require the disclosure of in-
formation that is material if it is cumulative in light of information already 
provided to the USPTO. 55 Cumulative information is information already 
before the USPTO, albeit from a different source. Thus, not providing the 
USPTO with cumulative information is not, in fact, a failure to disclose. 56 
The duty to disclose imposed by the doctrine applies to more than just 
the inventor. Rule 56 extends the duty to all "[i]ndividuals associated with 
the filing or prosecution of [the] patent application."57 This includes the 
attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the patent application. 58 The 
duty also applies to those who are "substantively involved" and associated 
with the inventor or her employer. 59 
The duty to disclose does not currently include a duty to search. The 
inequitable conduct doctrine only requires the applicant to disclose ma-
terial information within her possession or the possession of those other 
individuals associated with prosecution. The duty does not, however, 
compel an applicant to actively search for additional prior art and, in tum, 
disclose it to the USPTO. 60 
54. See Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006) (concerning potentially false statements by the inventor to the USPTO about 
the use of a prior art boring tool). 
55. Honeywell Int'l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 1000 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007) ("Information cumulative of other information already before the Patent Office 
is not material."); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2008) ("[I]nformation is material to patentability 
when it is not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the 
application .... "). 
56. See Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., 501 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(agreeing with a district court's finding of no inequitable conduct based, in part, on the 
applicant's belief that the undisclosed information was cumulative). 
57. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(c) (2008). 
58. !d. § 1.56(c)(2). 
59. !d. § 1.56(c)(3) ("Every other person who is substantively involved in the prepa-
ration or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the 
assignee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application."). For 
example, a senior scientist who is not a listed inventor, but worked with the inventor on 
the invention's underlying chemistry, is under a duty to disclose. See Sython IP, Inc. v. 
Pfizer Inc., 472 F. Supp. 2d 760, 775 (E.D. Va. 2007) (identifying at least six individuals 
under a duty to disclose). 
60. See FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
("As a general rule, there is no duty to conduct a prior art search, and thus there is no 
duty to disclose art of which an applicant could have been aware."). There have been 
recent cases that, arguably, establish a duty to inquire in limited circumstances as to poss-
ible prior art. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 
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4. Remedy 
The inequitable conduct doctrine is available as an affirmative defense 
to allegations of patent infringement. 61 An alleged infringer must prove, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the applicant intentionally failed to 
disclose information material to the invention's patentability during patent 
prosecution. 62 If inequitable conduct is established, all the patent's claims 
are rendered unenforceable. 63 Depending on the circumstances, inequita-
ble conduct with respect to a particular patent can infect and render unen-
forceable other related patents. 64 The doctrine has a much larger effect 
than a finding of invalidity for non-novelty or obviousness, which simply 
renders the particular claim in question invalid. 65 
C. Recent Critiques of the Doctrine 
Since its inception, 66 the doctrine has garnered a tremendous amount 
of attention and criticism from the bar and the judiciary. The Federal Cir-
cuit has often noted the importance and seriousness of the doctrine. 67 
Some Federal Circuit judges have gone out of their way to criticize the 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Where an applicant knows of information the materiality of which may 
so readily be determined, he or she cannot intentionally avoid learning of its materiality, 
even through gross negligence .... ").The court in Brasseler continued, however, noting 
that "[t]he mere possibility that material information may exist will not suffice to give 
rise to a duty to inquire .... " Id. at 1382. 
61. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(1) (2006) (indicating that an alleged infringer can plead 
"unenforceability"). 
62. See GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1273-74 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
63. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
64. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 812 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
65. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(2)-(3) (2006); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (indicating that validity is determined on a 
claim-by-claim basis). 
66. Many point to the Supreme Court's decision in Precision Instrument Manufac-
turing Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945), as the be-
ginning of the inequitable conduct doctrine. Mack, supra note 20, at 152. The Supreme 
Court in Precision Instrument grounded inequitable conduct in the doctrine of unclean 
hands. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 815-16. 
67. See Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366 ("[T]he severity of the penalty has not 
changed, and thus courts must be vigilant in not permitting the [inequitable conduct] de-
fense to be applied too lightly."). 
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current use of the doctrine-viewing it as "overplayed"68 and labeling its 
habitual assertion in litigation as "an absolute plague."69 
The doctrine gets as much attention, if not more, from patent practi-
tioners. Almost every patent Continuing Legal Education ("CLE") pro-
gram includes a discussion of the doctrine. 70 The Practicing Law Institu-
tion ("PLI") issues multiple articles a year on recent developments in ine-
quitable conduct law. 71 Even blog posts detailing recent inequitable con-
duct cases inevitably receive numerous comments from patent attorneys, 
postulating (and complaining) as to the breadth of the decision's impact. 72 
This attention by practitioners is not surprising given that the doctrine fo-
cuses on "the person rather than the patent" by reviewing the patent attor-
ney's actions to determine whether they engaged in inequitable conduct. 73 
This extensive attention from the courts and the bar has pushed the in-
equitable conduct doctrine into the general discussion about patent reform. 
Since early 2000, many commentators have focused on perceived short-
comings of the United States patent system. Highly publicized reports is-
sued by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") in 2003 and the National 
Research Council ("NRC") in 2004 discussed target areas for reform. 74 
Included in these discussions is the inequitable conduct doctrine. The ine-
68. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
69. See Burlington Indus. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
This critique has continued in recent case law. See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar 
Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) ("[I]nequitable 
conduct has taken on a new life as a litigation tactic."). 
70. See, e.g., American Intellectual Property Law Association, AIPLA 2008 Spring 
Meeting Schedule: Friday Schedule (May 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Meetings_and_Eventsl/Spring_Meetings/2 
0086/Program-Friday.pdf; University of Texas Continuing Legal Education, UTCLE 
12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute, Program for Patent Law - Austin, 
http://www.utcle.org/ conference_overview.php?conferenceid=763 (last visited Feb. 4, 
2009). 
71. See, e.g., Roxana H. Yang, Duty of Disclosure & Inequitable Conduct-Who, 
What, When, & How?, in ADVANCED PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP 2007: CLAIM 
DRAFTING & AMENDMENT WRITING, at 557, 562 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, 
& Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 11375, 2007). 
72. See, e.g., Posting of Dennis Crouch to Patently-0, What a Mess: Inequitable 
Conduct Based on Failure to Submit, http://www.patentlyo. cornlpatent/2007/05/ 
what_a_mess _ine.html (May 21, 2007 22:40 CST) (containing over a 110 comments to a 
post describing the holding in McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, 
Inc., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
73. Chisum, supra note 9, at 279. 
74. FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 
10. 
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qui table conduct doctrine has even garnered Congress's attention. Over 
the past four years, almost every draft of patent reform legislation contains 
some amendment to the doctrine. 75 Even the USPTO has proposed a new 
regulation concerning the applicant's duties regarding information sub-
missions. 76 
From this discourse, two main critiques have emerged. One, supported 
by the NRC report, is that the doctrine is asserted too frequently by defen-
dants and creates exorbitant litigation costs. 77 The second critique, dis-
cussed in the FTC report, focuses on the doctrine's failure to impose addi-
tional duties on the applicant, such as a duty to search or at least provide 
relevancy statements with regards to what is submitted. 78 Each noted 
problem has generated its own legislative solution, with the latter also 
prompting a proposed regulation by the USPTO. These two criticisms, the 
previously proposed legislation, and USPTO responses are discussed in 
detail below. 
1. Creation of Unnecessary Litigation Costs and the Legislative 
Response 
By recent estimates, the inequitable conduct defense is asserted in 
around one fourth of all patent cases filed. 79 More than one member of the 
75. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, llOth Cong. (2007); Patent 
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818 § 5, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 
2795 § 5, 109th Cong. (2005). The 2009 version of the Patent Reform Act does not modi-
fy the inequitable conduct doctrine, but there is still significant pressure to make statutory 
changes to the doctrine before the Act is adopted. See supra note 12. 
76. See Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Re-
lated Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
(proposing to change the IDS requirements to include relevancy statements, in addition to 
other requirements). 
77. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 123. 
78. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at 12-13. The contents of a relevancy 
statement can vary, but usually includes some statement by the applicant as to how the 
submitted art is relevant to the patentability of one or more of the application's claims. 
See, e.g., Mack, supra note 20, at 149. 
79. See !d. at 156 ("Accused infringers, however, continue to plead the defense with 
regularity. Table 1 illustrates this regularity; from 2000 to 2004, an inequitable conduct 
adjudication appeared in 16% to 35% of all reported patent opinions."); Katherine Nolan-
Stevaux, Note, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century: Combating the Plague, 
20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 160--62 (2005) ("[I]t appears that parties frequently allege 
inequitable conduct where courts find no evidence of it."). 
740 BERKELEYTECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:723 
judiciary has viewed this rate as inappropriately high. 80 The NRC report 
and other commentators concur. 81 
This rate of pleading inequitable conduct is problematic because litiga-
tion of inequitable conduct claims is particularly costly. Most of the high 
cost comes from the subjective element of the doctrine-intent. 82 The cir-
cumstantial nature of most intent evidence makes summary judgment par-
ticularly difficult. Moreover, the deposition of the prosecuting attorney 
who handled the application is almost always necessary in the inequitable 
conduct inquiry. 83 Such depositions are uniquely costly because they are 
littered with complex attorney-client privilege issues that generate their 
own legal questions which demand additional attorney and judicial re-
sources to resolve. 84 
Introducing inequitable conduct into the litigation also diverts attention 
from the heart of the dispute-the validity and infringement of the patent 
at issue. While inequitable conduct does concern the patent, the actual va-
lidity of the patent is irrelevant to the doctrine. Inequitable conduct inqui-
ries tum into satellite litigations where the effort expended has little spil-
lover benefits for other parts of the litigation. The time and energy spent 
on the defense may detract from the core issues and hamper their complete 
and correct resolution. 85 For these reasons, many push for reforms to low-
er the rate of pleading and reduce the cost of litigating inequitable con-
duct. 
80. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454; Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
81. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 122 ("Another major com-
plaint is that the defense is asserted too freely."); Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 79, at 148 
("The practice of asserting a defense of inequitable conduct, regardless of the merits of 
the defense in a given case, has reached the breaking point."). 
82. See Doug Harvey, Comment, Reinventing the U.S. Patent System: A Discussion 
of Patent Reform Through an Analysis of the Proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005, 38 
TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1133, 1152 (2006) ("Due to its subjective nature, the inequitable 
conduct defense is time consuming and expensive, and the abuse of the defense adds to 
the delays and increases the costs oflitigation."). 
83. Robert C. Faber, Prosecution Ethics, in ADVANCED PATENT PROSECUTION 
WORKSHOP 2008: CLAIM DRAFTING & AMENDMENT WRITING, at 13, 27 (PLI Patents, 
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 14964, 2008) 
("The time and cost of discovery will be increased by the need to investigate possible 
inequitable conduct and the associated discovery and, ultimately at trial, the cost of pre-
senting the separate inequitable conduct defense."). 
84. See Lynn C. Tyler, Kingsdown Fifteen Years Later: What Does It Take to Prove 
Inequitable Conduct?, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 267, 269-70 (2003) (noting that, in extreme cas-
es, inequitable conduct can cause the attorney-client privilege and work product immuni-
ty to be lost). 
85. See Goldman, supra note 18, at 89. 
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The 2005 proposed changes to the inequitable conduct doctrine, con-
tained in Section 5 of H.R. 2795, attempted to address the litigation cost 
concern. 86 The proposed legislation would have made the determination of 
inequitable conduct the exclusive province of the USPTO. 87 The doctrine 
would no longer be a defense to a claim of infringement. Instead, if ine-
quitable conduct were alleged in litigation, the matter would be referred to 
the USPTO after the litigation ended. 88 The legislation also required a 
predicate finding that the non-disclosed information rendered one or more 
asserted patent claim invalid. 89 
The 2006 version of the patent reform legislation, S 3 818, proposed 
modifications to the doctrine that were less dramatic than those in H.R. 
2975. S. 3818 did require a predicate finding of invalidity, 90 but kept the 
doctrine in district court, not proposing the use of the USPTO to adjudi-
cate such disputes. 91 
The changes in H.R. 2975, presumably, were intended to keep litiga-
tion costs down. Referral of the matter to the USPTO was one of the NRC 
report's proposals to "discourag[e] resort to the inequitable conduct de-
fense and therefore reduc[e] its cost."92 By making a finding of invalidity 
a prerequisite, costs would be reduced by limiting the instances under 
which the doctrine is litigated. This also necessarily heightens the mate-
riality standard, making the doctrine tougher to plead. An alleged infringer 
must claim the undisclosed information renders one or more patent claims 
invalid, not that the information is simply relevant to the patentability is-
sue. 
2. Lack of an Expanded Duty and the Legislative and USPTO 
Response 
Another criticism is the narrowness of the current duty to disclose. The 
critique is that the duty is improperly limited to providing only the infor-
86. See Patent Reform Act of2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
87. Patent Reform Act of2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 136(a), (c) ("No court or 
Federal department or agency other than the [USPTO], and no other Federal or State go-
vernmental entity, may investigate or make a determination or an adjudication with re-
spect to an alleged violation of the duty of candor and good faith .... "). 
88. /d. at§ 136(c)(4). 
89. That is, H.R. 2795 increases the standard of materiality to include only that in-
formation that actually results in a patent claim being held unpatentable. I d. at § 136( d). 
Also, the examiner must have relied on the information in question when determining 
patentability. Id. at§ 136(d)(3)(B). 
90. Patent Reform Act of2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006). 
91. See generally id. 
92. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 123. 
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mation already in the applicant's possession. 93 The applicant should do 
more. Suggestions range from requiring the applicant to search for addi-
tional material information and submit it to the USPTO to requiring the 
applicant to include "relevancy statements" indicating how the informa-
tion she does submit is relevant to the patentability of the application. 94 
Critics believe that the current doctrine's narrow dut,Y to disclose al-
lows the applicant to simply bury his head in the sand. 9 In order to mi-
nimize the scope of his duty to disclose, the applicant affirmatively avoids 
coming across new information. 96 And to avoid misrepresenting informa-
tion to the USPTO, the applicant says very little about what he does sub-
mit. 97 The USPTO is thus robbed of the additional knowledge a search 
would turn up and the insight that statements about the information would 
provide. 
Two specific reasons are offered for requiring a search. First, if the ap-
plicant searches prior to filing her application, she may find out that her 
invention is not patentable.98 Alternatively, she may discover that while 
patentable, the scope of protection she will get is narrow because the tech-
nological field is crowded. 99 If the invention sits in a field of art where 
93. See Thomas Schneck, The Duty to Search, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
Soc'v 689, 704 (2005) (arguing that there should be a duty to search and submit the re-
sults to the USPTO). 
94. Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related 
Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (setting 
forth the proposed modification to 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2008) to include "[a]dditional dis-
closure requirements" under§ 1.98(a)(3)); FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at 12-13 
(recommending the inclusion of statements of relevance regarding submitted prior art). 
95. Thomas, supra note 17, at 315 (noting that, because ofpotentialliability under 
the inequitable conduct doctrine, "many applicants are discouraged from conducting prior 
art searches in the first place"). 
96. /d. ("Concerned that the failure to disclose a known reference will lead to the 
unenforceability of the patent, some applicants prefer to await the examiner's search re-
sults rather than consult the prior art themselves."); see Scott D. Anderson, Comment, 
Inequitable Conduct: Persistent Problems and Recommended Resolutions, 82 MARQ. L. 
REv. 845, 852-53 (1999). 
97. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at 12 (noting the fear that "slight er-
rors in description could fuel claims of mischaracterization and inequitable conduct"). 
98. See Hal Gibson, Note, In the Wake ofEnzo: The Impact of the Federal Circuit's 
Decision on the U.S. Life Science Industry, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 903, 932 n.l76 (2004) 
("Many patent applicants (or more accurately, their attorneys) do conduct their own prior 
art search before filing their patent so as to better craft their own patent claims."). 
99. See John M. Benassi, et. al., Claim Construction and Proving Infringement: The 
Impact of Phillips, Festo, and Their Progeny, in PATENT LITIGATION 2008, at 201 (PLI 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 14977, 
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there has already been a tremendous amount of technology patented, she 
will not be able to capture much in a new patent application. As a result of 
the information discovered in pre-filing search, the applicant may forgo 
patenting altogether and remove the burden of examining an invalid or 
worthless application. Or, the patent applicant will tailor the application to 
contain more realistic claims in light of the prior art, simplifying examina-
tion by the USPT0. 100 
Second, more information presented to the USPTO can improve the 
patent examination. 101 With more information describing the prior art, the 
USPTO has a better chance of correctly determining the patent's validity. 
This line of arguments is exhaustively explored below in Section III.C. 102 
But, for now, it can simply be said that a duty to search is an information-
producing mechanism that would result in a more through and accurate 
examination. 
A duty to provide relevancy statements provides benefits similar to the 
last reason for a duty to search. Relevancy statements help the USPTO 
understand the submitted information in the context of patent applica-
tion. 103 The USPTO does not need to spend as much time digesting the 
submitted information. Nor does the USPTO have to expend as much 
energy placing the submitted information in the context of the patentabili-
ty of the claimed invention. Such statements facilitate a better and more 
efficient examination. 
Recent legislative and USPTO proposals address this concern of an 
overly narrow duty to disclose. In the 2007 Patent Reform Bill, Congress 
gives the USPTO the ability to establish an applicant's duty to search and 
disclose the results of that search when filing a patent application. 104 The 
2007 bill no longer focuses on the litigation cost reducing procedures in 
2008) ("[T]he prior art search could be directed to ensure that the most important claim 
elements (and those most likely to be copied) are drafted as precisely as possible."). 
100. See Changes To Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applica-
tions Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Ap-
plications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716, 46,720-21 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pt. 1) ("A number of patent applications contain a large number of claims, which makes 
efficient and effective examination of such applications problematic."). 
101. See Schneck, supra note 93, at 694 (noting that, due to resource constraints, ex-
aminers miss relevant prior art, which leads to the issuance of invalid patents). 
102. See infra Section III.C. 
103. See Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Re-
lated Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808,38,810 (July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 
1) (indicating that relevancy statements "are intended to provide meaningful information 
to the examiner"); FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at 12 (noting testimony that rele-
vancy statements leads to "better managed" and "quality enhanced" examination). 
104. Reform Act of2007, H.R. 1908, llOth Cong. § 5(a)-{b)(2007). 
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previous reform bills. 105 Instead, the focus is on expanding the duty go-
verned by inequitable conduct. 
The USPTO has proposed changes to the IDS requirements to require 
that applicants provide additional information, in certain circumstances, 
about the submitted information. 106 An applicant may be required to pin-
point representative portions of the submitted information, correlate these 
identified portions with the patent claims, and explain how the submitted 
information is different from other information already submitted. 107 The 
new rules would also require the applicant justify why the application is 
patentable in light of the submitted information depending on the number 
of submissions and the timing of the IDS's filing. 10 
D. Disconnects in the Current Discourse 
Almost every facet of the patent system-Congress, the Federal Cir-
cuit, the USPTO, and patent practitioners-is concerned about the state of 
the inequitable conduct doctrine and lodge specific criticisms against the 
doctrine. The judiciary and NRC both assert that the doctrine is over-
asserted and that this results in burdensome litigation costs. The FTC be-
lieves that the duty to disclose should be expanded. 
This is the first disconnect in the current discourse-the two major cri-
tiques of the doctrine push in opposite directions. Concerns about litiga-
tion costs suggest weakening the doctrine, but increasing the duty to dis-
close means the doctrine should be strengthened. The conflict between 
these two critiques is difficult to resolve. A reduction of litigation costs 
necessarily means rejecting a duty to search. Giving the doctrine a broader 
reach makes it easier and more likely to be asserted as a defense to a claim 
of patent infringement. 109 This magnifies the harm the litigation cost criti-
que is trying to minimize. From the other direction, the removal of the 
doctrine to the USPTO in order to reduce litigation costs would minimize 
any impact of a new duty to search. Moving the doctrine to a less favora-
ble forum makes its assertion and enforcement less likely, weakening the 
substantive boost a new duty is meant to create. 
105. Some of the proposed amendments arguably address litigation costs. See, e.g., 
H.R. 1908 § 12(b), (c) (modifying the inequitable conduct doctrine by heightening the 
standard for intent and providing for less harsh remedies). 
106. Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related 
Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,809. 
107. Jd. at 38,809-10. 
108. !d. 
109. See Cronin, supra note 19, at 1346 ("However, as the definition becomes more 
expansive there becomes more of an incentive for alleged infringers to charge inequitable 
conduct during litigation proceedings."). 
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The character of these two criticisms exemplifies another disconnect. 
Both of these concerns are utilitarian-focused, looking at how the doctrine 
impacts the patent system's goal of creating an optimal incentive to in-
vent. 110 The traditional rationale for the inequitable conduct doctrine, in 
contrast, is the maintenance of ethical standards during prosecution. 
The doctrine's equitable roots give the doctrine its moral bent. Since 
the mid-1800's, the judiciary has driven the development of the inequita-
ble conduct doctrine as a creature of equity. 111 The Supreme Court identi-
fied the inequitable doctrine as the "equitable maxim that 'he who comes 
into equity must come with clean hands."' 112 If a patent was born from 
fraud or deceit, then its holder cannot ask a court to enforce the patent. 113 
The doctrine is seen as "a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the require-
ments of conscience and good faith." 114 
In contrast, the alleged problems with the doctrine focus on the doc-
trine's impact on the optimal procurement and enforcement of patent 
rights. The litigation-costs argument is part of a larger movement to re-
duce the costs and uncertainty associated with patent litigation. 115 A re-
duction in such costs minimizes the likelihood a patent holder can impro-
perly holdup a competitor practicing outside the area of valid patent pro-
tection.116 The argument to broaden disclosure duties is focused on ensur-
ing that only truly patentable inventions receive patent protection. 117 If 
patents are issued for inventions that are actually unpatentable, these 
"bad" patents will improperly deter competitors and follow-on innova-
tors. 118 These problems are focused on the utilitarian goal of maintaining 
110. See, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 7 (concluding that one of 
the reforms needed, to created effective and efficient enforcement of patent rights, is the 
modification of subjective litigation elements, such as the inequitable conduct doctrine). 
111. See Mack, supra note 20, at 152; Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. 
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,815 (1945). 
112. Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814. 
113. !d. 
114. !d. 
115. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 7, 123. 
116. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the 
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1200--01 (2004) ("Even when patents 
do not convey market power, patentees may exploit uncertainty regarding the scope of 
patents to deter competition by posing the threat of high-cost infringement litigation."). 
117. See supra Section II.C.2. 
118. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1516 (200 1) ("Certainly the issuance of bad patents has the potential to deter 
competition that should be lawful in some marginal cases."); Leslie, supra note 16, at 
113--14. (arguing that "some invalid patents can deter market entry and decrease consum-
er welfare even without active enforcement"). 
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an optimal incentive to invent-providing protection where it is needed 
but not giving overprotection that does more harm to innovation than 
good. 
A similar disconnect surfaces when comparing the current view of the 
inequitable conduct doctrine to the patent reform movement as a whole. 
One of the focuses of the movement is the optimal balance of patent pro-
tection and open competition. That is, providing patent protection where it 
is needed to prompt invention and innovation, but reigning in patent pro-
tection where such protection, on net, is detrimental to society. 119 Theine-
quitable conduct doctrine, in contrast, focuses on the deontological ethics 
ofthe patent applicant's actions. The reform movement is results oriented, 
while the doctrine is focused on the means. This view of the doctrine finds 
no home in today's patent discourse. 
III. FRAMING THE INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DOCTRINE AS 
A PATENT QUALITY MECHANISM 
Scholars have written extensively on the inequitable conduct doc-
trine. 120 But the scholarship has not engaged in two basic, interrelated ex-
ercises that would greatly assist the discourse. First, no one has attempted 
a comprehensive, theoretical analysis of how the doctrine as a whole af-
fects patent applicants, patent examination, and potential inventors. That 
is, they have not linked the doctrine to the general push to improve patent 
quality and reform the patent system. A majority of the scholarship, in-
stead, is piecemeal-focusing on specific parts of the doctrine, 121 particu-
lar proposed statutory changes, and individual Federal Circuit cases. 122 
Performing a fundamental analysis of the doctrine would provide a 
framework by which current and future reforms could be tested. 
Second, and related, almost all the scholarship has kept the discussion 
tied to the doctrine's equitable roots, focusing on the doctrine as an ethical 
119. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. 
L. REv. 1575, 1614-30 (2003) (discussing how patents have positive or negative impact 
on different industries based on the nature of investment and discovery within each in-
dustry). 
120. See, e.g., Cedric A. D'Hue, Disclosing an Improper Verb Tense: Are Scientists 
Knaves and Patent Attorneys Jackals Regarding the Effects of Inequitable Conduct?, 14 
U. BAL T. lNTELL. PROP. L.J. 121 (2006); Goldman, supra note 18; Robert A. Migliorini, 
Lessons for Avoiding Inequitable Conduct and Prosecution Laches in Patent Prosecution 
and Litigation, 46 IDEA 221 (2006). 
121. See, e.g., Cronin, supra note 19. 
122. See, e.g., supra note 19. 
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tool. 123 As just noted, these discussions are of little help when proposed 
changes need to be considered in the context of broader, utilitarian-
justified reforms. 124 Thinking about the doctrine needs to be modernized 
and framed in the same terms as other targets of patent reform. 125 
This Part revisits the underlying rationale for the doctrine. Instead of 
focusing on ethics, this Part articulates the various ways in which the doc-
trine impacts the quality of the application and its examination. 126 The 
doctrine is well suited to affect quality of the process of issuing a patent 
given that the doctrine applies to all aspects of prosecution related to pa-
tentability. The beauty of placing inequitable conduct in the context of pa-
tent quality is that this analysis interjects the doctrine into the current dis-
course of patent reform. As demonstrated below, the doctrine can be an 
effective tool in improving patent quality, the system of patent examina-
tion, and the incentives generated by the system. 
123. As previously discussed, a recent article has discussed the inequitable conduct 
doctrine's impact on patent quality but fails to fully develop the concept. See Mack, su-
pra note 20, at 166-69. 
124. One of the main thrusts of the patent reform movement is to ensure the proper 
balance between the incentive to invent and the ability to follow-on innovate is main-
tained. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 10, at Exec. Summ., 4-5. Part of this reform 
is to ensure that the only patents to issue from the USPTO are those that truly meet the 
patentability standards. !d. at 9-10. 
125. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (indicating that the 
nonobviousness requirement should not be set too low so as to allow patents to issue that 
"might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts"); FED. TRADE COMM'N, 
supra note 10, at 15 (noting competition concerns that should be considered when re-
forming the nonobviousness requirement). 
126. Again, this is not to say that the inequitable conduct doctrine's impact on patent 
quality has never been mentioned. See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 
(C. C.P.A. 1970) ("The highest standards of honesty and candor on the part of applicants 
in presenting such facts to the office are thus necessary elements in a working patent sys-
tem. We would go so far as to say they are essential."); 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2008) ("The 
public interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at 
the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teach-
ings of all information material to patentability."); Mack, supra note 19, at 166-69; Rene 
D. Tegtmeyer, The Patent and Trademark Office View of Inequitable Conduct or At-
tempted Fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 88, 88 (1988) (quot-
ing former Assistant Commissioner of the USPTO that "[t]he purpose of the duty of dis-
closure requirement, as the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) views it, is to improve 
the quality of examination and the validity of patents by assuring that material informa-
tion is called to the examiner's attention and considered in the patent examining 
process"); Thomas, supra note 17, at 313-14 (labeling the inequitable conduct doctrine as 
an "information-gathering technique[]"). 
Again, none of these articles has provided a detailed theory as to exactly how the doc-
trine can impact patent quality. 
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In order to frame the doctrine as a patent quality tool, this Part first de-
fines patent quality and links the quality concerns to the need for informa-
tion. This Part also discusses the lack of an inherent incentive for appli-
cants and others to provide the USPTO with relevant information during 
examination. This Part then explains how the inequitable conduct doctrine 
provides such an incentive. The doctrine improves the quality of the appli-
cation by increasing the patent attorney knowledge and understanding of 
the invention and the related technological area. The doctrine also helps 
ensure that the application and related correspondence are drafted with 
care. The doctrine operates as an information producer and verifier, giving 
the USPTO more resources and time to properly examine the application. 
A. Patent Quality and Information 
Put simply, optimal patent quality is the issuance of patents that meet 
the patent requirements and the rejection of those that do not. The assur-
ance of a good patent quality is all about information-both access to it 
and time for the examiners to use it. 
1. Patent Quality Problem Defined 
The concept of patent quality focuses on the patentability of those pa-
tent claims allowed by the USPTO. The patent system assumes that only 
those patent applications that describe and claim a patentable advance are 
granted the power to exclude. Those patents that meet the validity re-
quirements--claim useful, novel, and nonobvious inventions that are fully 
disclosed and enabled-are considered to be of good quality. 127 Patents 
issued by the USPTO that claim subject matter that does not meet the pa-
tentability requirements are known as poor quality, or "bad" patents. 128 
Most agree that the patent system should maintain high patent quali-
ty. 129 Granting patents on patentable advances provides incentives for the 
127. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 15, at 46-49. 
128. See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market 
and How Should We Change?- The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 
61, 63 (2006) ("The common criticism from all sides is that the Patent Office grants pa-
tent claims that are broader than what is merited by the invention and the prior art, result-
ing in so-called "bad" or improvidently granted patents."); Lee Petherbridge, Positive 
Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 175 (2006) ("Questionable, or low quality, patents are those 
patents that should never have issued from the Patent Office because they fail to meet the 
statutory requirements for patentability."). 
129. There is debate, however, as to how much resources should be allocated to en-
suring that valid patents are granted by the USPTO. Compare Lemley, supra note 130, at 
1497 (arguing that few resources should be expended in improving examination 
"[b ]ecause so few patents are ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper for 
society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases than to invest addi-
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creation of beneficial technical advances and facilitates their commerciali-
. 130 s . b fi h 1" . zatwn. oc1ety ene 1ts w en qua 1ty patents 1ssue. 
In contrast, the issuance of patents of poor quality has deleterious ef-
fects. A bad patent, for example, may give its holder exclusive control 
over a minor technological advance, creating roadblocks to innovation 
typically allowed under patent law. 131 Since even poor quality patents en-
joy a presumption of validity, holders of bad patents have the power to 
impede the legitimate innovation of others and seek licensing fees for ac-
tivities that are actually allowable. 132 The bad patent creates in terrorem 
effects, deterring socially acceptable and beneficial behavior. 133 Those 
who want to use the patented technology must expend significant re-
sources to determine and, if forced, legally establish, that the patent is 
invalid. 
Many factors contribute to the poor quality of U.S. patents. Some cri-
tiques point to the standards for determining patentability, concluding that 
they are too low and, even if properly applied, result in the issuance of so-
cially detrimental patents. 134 Most, however, view the patent quality prob-
lem as an information and resource problem. That is, the USPTO does not 
tiona! resources examining patents that will never be heard from again"), with Shubha 
Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optima/Ignorance in the 
Patent Office, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1219, 1225-26 (2004) (arguing that changes in the ex-
amination process can be a cost-beneficial way of improving patent quality). 
130. Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 
71 U. CHI. L. REv. 129, 129-30 (2004) (describing patent law's ability to create an ex 
ante incentive to invent); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent Sys-
tem, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-78 (1977) (describing an ex post theory of patents where 
protection assist the development of the patented invention). 
131. See 3 ROBERT MERGES & JOHN DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERiALS 647 (3d ed. 2002); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an 
Evidentiary Lens: The "Suggestion Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REv. 
1517, 1525 ("Exclusive control over these minor developments would act as roadblocks, 
creating disincentives to future inventors. Many patents on small technical advances 
make it extremely difficult and 'expensive to search and to license' these patents in order 
to produce further innovations."). 
132. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 15, at 47-48 (noting that the presumption 
of validity makes "defendants face an uphill battle persuading the courts to overrule that 
errant determination"). 
133. See John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Ap-
proaches to Patent Administrative Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 727, 731 (2002) (de-
tailing these detrimental effects). 
134. The debate surrounding the nonobviousness requirement provides a good exam-
ple of this type of discussion. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study 
of Legal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2007) (discussing the various standards for de-
termining nonobviousness and how they implicate differing policy views on patent law). 
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have access to adequate information to correctly determine whether a 
claimed invention is novel and nonobvious. 135 This is particularly proble-
matic in new technological areas, such as software and business methods, 
where the best information on what has previously been done is not in 
prior patents, but trade publications, public presentations, product bro-
chures, and computer code. 136 
Even if the USPTO does have access to such information, patent ex-
aminers often do not have the time to find and apply it to the patent 
claims. 137 The number of patent applications is rising exponentially each 
year while, at the same time, the USPTO faces a significant examiner attri-
tion rate. 138 Examiners are given very little time to perform a complete 
examination-gain an understanding of the invention, determine the 
meaning of the patent claims, search the prior art, apply the prior art to the 
claims, write office actions, and respond to the applicant's arguments mul-
tiple times. 139 
Finally, some worry that poorly drafted patents hinder the examiner's 
ability to understand the claimed subject matter. 140 The harder the applica-
135. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 15, at 46 ("Information is a second signifi-
cant impediment to PTO review."). 
136. See Thomas, supra note 17, at 318-19. Thomas describes the unique informa-
tion problem as it relates to new technologies: 
!d. 
For software, business methods, and other postindustrial inventions, the 
repository of issued patents insufficiently samples the prior art. 
Examiners who primarily rely upon the patent literature to generate 
prior art in these fields are quite likely to allow patents to issue based 
upon information already within the public domain. Even those diligent 
examiners who consult the nonpatent literature might be limited to a 
sparse prior art collection. 
137. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 15, at 46 (identifying the resource problem 
faced by the USPTO to effectively review the growing number of applications); Thomas, 
supra note 17, at 314 ("[T]he average time allocated for an examiner to address one ap-
plication is understood to be between sixteen and seventeen hours. Given the complexi-
ties involved in parsing an application, conducting a prior art search and drafting an Of-
fice Action, this period is surprisingly short."). 
138. See Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Re-
view, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 123, 132 (2006) ("[T]he USPTO still 
cannot hire quickly enough to keep pace with both the demands of the job and the attri-
tion rate."). 
139. Thomas, supra note 17, at 314 (noting that examiners are allotted between six-
teen to seventeen hours per application). 
140. Petherbridge, supra note 128, at 181-83, 192 ("[T]he better the Patent Office 
collects and uses information about the boundaries of the property right, the higher the 
quality of examination."). 
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tion is to comprehend, the more difficult it is for the examiner to properly 
and efficiently examine the application. 141 As the saying goes-garbage 
in, garbage out. 
2. Disincentives for Those Outside the USPTO to Solve the 
Quality Problem 
Why is the patent quality problem not self-correcting? Surely patent 
applicants have an interest in high patent quality. If the USPTO is doing a 
good job examining patents, a patent holder can readily rely on the USP-
TO's determination and not expend resources in making its own assess-
ment after issuance. In turn, a patent holder can charge more for a clearly 
valid patent and valid patents are less likely to get embroiled in costly liti-
gation and, thus, more efficient to enforce. Put simply, the value of a qual-
ity patent is higher than a bad one. Why wouldn't patentees want that? 
Patent applicants have countervailing strategic reasons to ignore patent 
quality. As mentioned, even bad patents ~rovide value to the holder be-
cause of the costs they create for others. 42 Any attempt to assist in im-
proving patent quality may destroy a bad patent's value altogether by pre-
venting it from ever issuing. 143 An issued, poor quality patent is more val-
uable than no patent at all. 
Even for good patents, it may be in applicants' best interest to keep pa-
tent quality information to themselves. Applicants are in the best position 
to determine the true validity of the patent because of the information 
asymmetry between the inventor and potential challengers. 144 The inven-
tor and related individuals know the most about the invention and poten-
tial prior art in the invention's technical field. 145 Thus, the patentee can 
make its own determination as to the quality of the patent. While costly, 
this determination is more difficult, if not impossible, for those without 
141. !d. 
142. See Leslie, supra note 16, at 113-28 (detailing the many ways invalid patents 
"injure competition"). 
143. See R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the 
Failure ofFesto, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 159, 215 (2002) (arguing that the patentee is incenti-
vized to not provide prior art to the USPTO to "increase[e] the possibility that the PTO 
will 'miss something' and allow the unwarranted scope"). 
144. !d. at 214 ("Given the asymmetry of information, the incentives for a patentee to 
fail to produce relevant information are substantial."). 
145. See Cotropia, supra note 22, at 84 ("The information in the specification is pro-
duced by the inventor, the lowest cost source for invention-specific information."); 
Wagner, supra note 143, at 213 ("Among the 'parties' to the patent transaction, the pa-
tentee is either the best informed or the one who can most easily and cheaply become the 
best informed about the context of her innovation."). 
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easy access to information the patentee holds. 146 This information asym-
metry gives the patentee the ability to engage in strategic behavior by 
withholding information and preventing a potential licensee or defendant 
from knowing the true value of the patent. 
Irrespective of information asymmetry and strategic behavior, the cost 
of improving the quality of examination alone may deter applicants from 
engaging in self-help. Assisting in the examination process by either doing 
a pre-filing search for prior art or submitting prior art to the USPTO is a 
costly endeavor. 147 Some applicants are willing to take the risk of receiv-
ing a bad patent given the high costs of ensuring the patent is a good one. 
Finally, other applicants may be ignorant of the patent quality situation 
at the USPTO. 148 An examination for patentability is what an applicant 
pays for and some may assume that is what they will get. 
Third parties have no incentive to assist in the examination process. 
Mechanisms do exist for third parties to participate in an ongoing exami-
nation or to force the reexamination of an issued patent. 149 However, be-
cause challenges to validity "exhibit the characteristics of public goods," 
potential challengers face a collective action problem. 150 A successful 
challenger cannot prevent others from free-riding on the resulting patent 
invalidation by practicing the previously exclusive invention. 151 A poten-
tial challenger is better off keeping the invalidity information to herself 
and only using it when she is accused directly ofinfringement. 152 
Because of these reasons, the patent system cannot rely on applicants 
or third parties to sua sponte assist the patent examination process. Infor-
mation-forcing rules must be considered. 153 That is, certain patent doc-
146. Wagner, supra note 143, at 215 (indicating that an applicant will not produce 
"the sort of information that might allow the PTO and the public to more usefully eva-
luate the scope of the patent"). 
14 7. Lemley, supra note 130, at 1510 (reporting the average cost of a prior art search 
as between $5000 and $7000). 
148. See, e.g., Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (re-
cognizing that some inventors do not have a sophisticated understanding of the patent law 
system). 
149. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006) (interference proceedings); 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 
(2006) (ex parte reexamination); 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2006) (inter partes reexamina-
tion); see also Thomas, supra note 17, at 326-28 (detailing these various avenues of third 
party challenges, including a proposed post-grant opposition system). 
150. Thomas, supra note 17, at 333. 
151. /d. at 333-34. 
152. /d. at 334. 
153. See Wagner, supra note 143, at 216-17,221 (discussing penalties for underpro-
duction of information and viewing the prosecution history estoppel doctrine as one of 
these penalties); cf Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. IN-
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trines should force the patent applicant to act against their strategic inter-
est. The inequitable conduct doctrine serves in this capacity by incentiviz-
ing applicants to produce valuable information and, in tum, improve pa-
tent quality. 
B. Doctrine's Ability to Improve the Quality of Information 
before USPTO 
The inequitable conduct doctrine is a disclosure doctrine, which, by its 
inherent nature, creates a flow of information from the applicant to the 
USPTO. The doctrine does even more by focusing on the production of 
information relevant to patentability and, in tum, de facto verifying it. 
Both of these aspects of the doctrine improve patent quality and are dis-
cussed below. 
1. Produces Relevant Information to the USPTO 
At its core, the doctrine is an information producer. The inequitable 
conduct doctrine requires patent applicants provide the USPTO with in-
formation relevant to the patentability of the claimed invention. 154 The 
doctrine acts as a conduit through which information from the patent at-
torney, the inventor, and related parties flows to the examiner. This infor-
mation, coming in the form of patents, periodicals, data, physical speci-
mens, affidavits, and the like, is directly related to patent examiner's pri-
mary responsibility-determining the application's patentability. 
This information is especially relevant because the doctrine draws it 
from those who know the most about the invention and its area of technol-
ogy-the inventor and those directly involved in the patent's prosecu-
tion.155 These are all individuals-the bench scientists, technicians, tech-
nology group leaders, in-house patent attorneys, etc.-who were either 
intimately involved in the invention's creation or in the drafting of the pa-
tent application. 
Getting information from these individuals gives the examiner access 
to information that is not contained in the databases readily available to 
her. Patent examiners have the ability to search world-wide patent data-
bases and some technical article databases. However, they do not have 
ready access to all technical literature, such as specialized industry publi-
TELL. PROP. L. 215, 221 (2004) (arguing that a strong dedication doctrine "improve[s] 
overall patent quality by creating incentives for good patent drafting at the earliest stages 
of the patent acquisition process, and long before litigation arises"). 
154. See supra Section II.A. 
155. See supra note 59 (identifying the various individuals beyond just the inventor 
who have a duty to disclose under the inequitable conduct doctrine). 
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cations or dissertations, or the technologies themselves, such as computer 
code listings or actual devices. 156 The USPTO does not have access to in-
formation in the technology areas new to patenting. 157 Patent examiners 
also must rely on applicants to inform them of potential offers to sale, con-
ference wesentations, test data, and product brochures regarding the in-
vention. 58 
The doctrine generates valuable information by placing information 
production responsibilities on a low-cost provider. Production of informa-
tion costs the applicant, 159 but the doctrine limits this cost by requiring the 
applicant to consider only the information already in her possession. 160 
More importantly, the cost to the applicant is lower than the cost of the 
examiner finding the same information. The examiner has some specia-
lized knowledge, but less than the applicant in understanding the particular 
invention and processing the information already in the applicant's pos-
session.161 Even if the examiner can gain access to information similar to 
that which is at the disposal of the applicant, the examiner starts from 
scratch in evaluating the information's relevance to patentability. For at 
156. Empirically, examiners are at a "disadvantage in searching for non-patent prior 
art and foreign patents." Bhaven N. Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empiri-
cal Analysis 3 (Sept. 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
siepr.stanford.edul programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_ new.pdf_l.pdf. Notably, the 
information examiners have access to is growing everyday. See MPEP § 901.06(a) (2007) 
(describing the resources available to patent examiners); The Scientific and Technical 
Information Center ("STIC"), available at http://wwwl.uspto.gov/web/ offices/pac/dapp/ 
sir/ stic/ brochure. html (same); lain M. Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners 
Equal? The Impact of Characteristics on Patent Statistics and Litigation Outcomes, 
(Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8980, 2002), available at 
http://www.nber.org/ papers/w8980 (describing the STIC). A vast amount of inventor 
specific material, or hard to find material in a given field, is just not accessible. 
157. Peter S. Menell, A Method For Reforming the Patent System, 13 MICH. TELE-
COMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 504 (2007) ("Similarly, since this is a new patent field, ex-
aminers have relatively little training in this area, there is little or no patent prior art, and 
time and database constraints severely limit the ability of examiners to search non-patent 
prior art."); Cockburn, supra note 156, at 6 ("In very young technologies, or in areas 
where the USPTO has just begun to grant patents, there may be very limited patent prior 
art."). 
158. This information is unlikely to be found in any database available at the USPTO. 
See, e.g., supra note 156. 
159. See infra Section IV.C (detailing the costs of submitting information to the 
USPTO). 
160. See supra Section II.A (noting how the current doctrine does not include a duty 
to search). 
161. See supra note 145 (explaining how the inventor is in the best position to know 
the most about her invention). 
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least some information, the applicant has already filtered out the irrelevant 
material to force the examiner to repeat the process would be wasteful. 
The breadth of relevant information under the doctrine-information 
that simply creates a prima facie case of invalidity but does not necessarily 
render the claim invalid-has a second-order information production ef-
fect. The exact information produced by an applicant may not be used by 
the examiner, but that information can mark a gath to a different technolo-
gical area that contains relevant information. 1 The information may also 
contain or prompt a line of technical thought that could justify a rejec-
tion. 163 
By mandating production of this valuable information, the inequitable 
conduct doctrine addresses some of the causes of the current patent quality 
problem. The doctrine provides the examiner with more invention-specific 
information from which sources examiners likely do not have access. The 
better the information, the better the examination. 164 Furthermore, the bur-
den of producing this information is not born by the examiner, so it in-
creases the amount of time the examiner has to complete the examination. 
2. Verifies Information Provided to the USPTO 
The doctrine also works as an information verifier. The inequitable 
conduct doctrine fundamentally requires that patent applicants must be 
truthful in their correspondence with the USPT0. 165 They cannot misre-
present information. Nor can they omit anything relevant to the truthful-
ness of disclosed information. Because of this duty of truthfulness and full 
disclosure, an examiner does not have to question the veracity of a state-
ment or response by an applicant. They are self-authenticating. 
162. See, e.g., In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (looking to folding bed art to invalidate an application directed toward a folding 
treadmill). 
163. For example, examiners reject a claim as obvious if they find a reason to com-
bine the prior art. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,416-17 (2007). 
164. See Michael Astorino, Obviously Troublesome: How High Should the Standard 
Be for Obtaining a Patent, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 239, 250 (2007) ("The 
better the search the better the prior art rejections."); Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 79, at 
159-60 ("[I]nequitable conduct [claims in patent law] also function[] as a penalty default 
to discourage applicants from playing strategic games."); Posting of Dennis Crouch to 
Patently-0, Evidence Based Prosecution: Non-Patent Art Leads to Rejections, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/200611 O/evidence_based_3.html (Oct. 29, 2006 22:03 
CST) (finding that most rejections are based on non-patent art). 
165. See Li Second Family Ltd. P'ship v. Toshiba Corp., 231 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) ("[A]ffirmative misrepresentations of material facts, failure to disclose materi-
al information, or submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to 
deceive, constitutes inequitable conduct."). 
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The doctrine's information verification function comes at a low cost. 
The individuals who make statements-the applicant, patent attorney, and 
related parties-are the ones who have to stand by their reliability. And 
since the applicant makes the statements, she is in the best position to at-
test to their accuracy. In contrast, the patent examiner is in a very poor po-
sition to determine veracity. Almost all correspondence is done in writing, 
removing the option for examiners to look for visual or audible signs of a 
particular statement's truthfulness. 166 With their heavy workload, examin-
ers do not have the time to independently verify all of an applicant's 
statements and claims. 167 Nor do examiners have the resources or the 
training. 168 Verification costs are further minimized by re~uiring the ap-
plicant to attest only for information in her possession. 1 9 No duty to 
search for relevant art or other information exists currently, and thus, the 
applicant is not asked to expend the time and resources to attest to all the 
information or knowledge in a given area. 
The doctrine also works as an external verifier of information. The 
threat of unenforceability not only assures the examiner that statements 
made by the applicant are true, it also assures others external to the USP-
TO that the information is correct. 170 Members of the public who may be 
looking at the patent as either an educational tool or an indicator of the 
patent holder's technological direction can rely on the inequitable conduct 
doctrine to settle any question as to the application's truthfulness. The ap-
plicant, as was the case when compared to the examiner, is in a much low-
er cost position to verify this information than each member of the public. 
Problematically, the truth of any Riven submission is only as good as 
the subjective belief of the submitter. 1 1 The intent requirement of the ine-
quitable conduct doctrine requires that the applicant only subjectively be-
166. Examiners do, on occasion, correspond with applicants by phone and in inter-
views. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.133 (2008) (establishing rules regarding examiner interviews). 
167. They can make a request for additional information. 37 C.F.R. § 1.105 (2008). 
But, these are rarely used, most probably because making one uses up scarce examination 
time. 
168. See, e.g., U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Patent Training Academy 
(PTA) (Mar. 6, 2006), http://usptocareers.gov/pdf/PatentTraining Academy 1.pdf (listing 
the areas in which examiners are trained). 
169. See supra Section II.A. 
170. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 625, 658 (2002) ("At the 
very least, investors can be assured that firms will not make objectively false statements 
in the body of the patent; if they do, they will bear both actual and reputational costs."). 
171. See supra Section II.B.3. 
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lieve that what is submitted is true. 172 It could tum out that the applicant 
was, objectively, wrong in her conclusion-the information may actually 
be incorrect. So, the doctrine's ability to verify information is only as good 
as the applicant's subjective knowledge. If the information is actually 
false, a reliant examiner could be lead astray by the erroneous comment. 
However, while this is certainly possible, the applicant is in the best posi-
tion to have a correct understanding of how her invention works when she 
came up with the invention, the result of any tests done on the invention, 
and so on. Other statements, such as those in affidavits, are not meant to 
prove anything more than the affirmant's subjective belief. The applicant's 
subjective believe is, in most instances, the best the system can produce 
and the inequitable conduct doctrine ensures that is what is communicated. 
This verification function improves patent quality. The quality of the 
information before the examiner is increased because it is much more like-
ly to be true under the doctrine. Moreover, the examiner does not have to 
waste any of the finite examination time on making truth determinations. 
C. Doctrine's Ability to Improve the Quality of the Patent 
Application 
The doctrine also improves the quality the patent application and other 
correspondence with the USPTO. It does this by increasing the patent at-
torney's knowledge of the invention and related technology and causing 
the attorney to exercise more care when drafting the application and cor-
respondence. By improving the quality of these documents-both their 
technical fidelity and accuracy-the doctrine can improve the quality of 
examination and the issued patent itself. 
1. Increases the Patent Attorneys Knowledge of the Invention 
and Related Technology 
The patent attorney, in the process of complying with the inequitable 
conduct doctrine, gains a great deal of knowledge about the invention and 
its technological field. Initially, compliance generates a base ofknowledge 
in the relevant technology. To assess materiality, the patent attorney must 
read all of the information within her possession to determine its relevance 
172. See Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) ("Intent [to deceive the USPTO] is a subjective inquiry into whether the inventor 
knew the information was material and chose not to disclose it."). 
758 BERKELEYTECHNOLOGYLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 24:723 
to patentability. 173 The doctrine's focus on patentability information forces 
the attorney to concentrate on information related to the invention. Take 
the patent at issue in Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N. V., which 
claimed a specific type of genetically-modified corn that is toxic to in-
sects, but not humans. 174 The inequitable conduct doctrine would require 
the patent attorney who prosecuted the patent to read and analyze the in-
formation within her possession discussing the genetic modification of 
food and safe pesticide products in order to determine what needs to be 
disclosed. Through the process, she would learn the chemistry and biology 
behind genetic modification and pesticides. She would also learn the com-
position of previous pesticides, how they were designed, and their particu-
lar uses. 175 The patent attorney digests this type of information not only to 
gain an understanding of the technological area, but also to comply with a 
legal doctrine. This added importance means that not only will patent at-
torneys read the information, but they will do so with care and attention to 
detail. 
In complying with the doctrine, the patent attorney also learns more 
about the invention itself. The patent attorney must obviously speak to the 
inventor in order to draft the apglication and get an understanding of what 
she can claim as the invention. 76 The inequitable conduct doctrine, how-
ever, forces her to dig deeper and analyze all information regarding the 
invention. She must evaluate all publications, correspondence, and prior 
uses regarding the invention to see if there is any material information-
such as a public use or an offer for sale-she must disclose. 177 The patent 
attorney must also ensure that all of the statements in the application re-
173. The inequitable conduct doctrine inquires as to whether a piece of information 
meets a threshold level of materiality. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 
329 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
174. See Monsanto Co. v. Bayer Bioscience N.V., 514 F.3d 1229, 1237-39 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008). 
175. See id. at 1238-39. 
176. An application is not complete until the inventor signs an oath declaring, 
amongst other things, that "[ s ]tates that the person making the oath or declaration ac-
knowledges the duty to disclose to the Office all information known to the person to be 
material to patentability as defined in§ 1.56." 37 C.F.R. § 1.63(b)(3) (2008). The USPTO 
recently stated that it would reject oaths that "do not expressly acknowledge a duty to 
disclose information material to patentability." U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Duty of 
Disclosure Language Set Forth in Oaths or Declarations Filed in Nonprovisional Patent 
Applications (Jan. 2, 2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/ 
dapp/ op Ia! preognotice/ duty_ of_ disclosure. pdf. 
177. This information would be relevant to patentability in light of the on-sale bar. 
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006); Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 
1370, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing the materiality of on-sale information). 
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garding the invention's operation, prior testing, and the invention's con-
struction are correct. 178 
The doctrine is also structured to funnel information from the inventor 
and related parties to the patent attorney. The duty to disclose is not im-
posed only on the patent attorney communicating with the USPTO. The 
inventor and "[ e ]very other person who is substantively involved in the 
preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with 
the inventor" must also disclose material information. 179 Material informa-
tion in the hands of any such individual necessarily makes its way to the 
patent attorney before it is disclosed to the USPTO. 180 The patent attorney 
is the hub for all communications to and from the USPT0. 181 The doc-
trine's broad scope thus causes those most knowledgeable of the invention 
and relevant technology to share their knowledge with the patent attorney 
to meet their duty to disclose. 182 As a result, the drafter of the application 
is exposed to even more relevant information. 
All this additional knowledge translates into a patent application that is 
easier to examine. Many patent law doctrines ask the USPTO and courts 
to view the patent through the lens of one skilled in the relevant technolo-
gical art. 183 A knowledgeable patent attorney can write to this intended 
audience because she has gained an understanding of a given science or 
area of engineering and knows the relevant terminology. 184 This means the 
178. This information would be relevant to the disclosure requirements. See 35 
u.s.c. § 112 ~ 1 (2006). 
179. 37 C.F.R. § !.56( c) (2008). 
180. This is typically done by an over-inclusive request by the patent attorney asking 
the relevant parties if they know of any information related to the invention's subject 
matter. 
181. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.33, 1.34 (2008) (noting that patent attorneys act as a repre-
sentative of the inventor filing for an application). 
182. See supra note 147 (describing how the inventor has the greatest knowledge of 
the invention). 
183. Patent claims-which define the scope of exclusivity-are interpreted as the 
terms are understood by one skilled in the art. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 
1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane) ("[T]he ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term 
is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question 
at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application."). 
"The enablement requirement is satisfied when one skilled in the art, after reading the 
specification, could practice the claimed invention without undue experimentation." AK 
Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 
731,736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
184. See Patricia Wright, Writing Technical Information, 14 REv. REs. Eouc. 327, 
339-40 (1987) (discussing the knowledge needed to be an effective technical writer). 
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examiner, who specializes in the invention's technological field, 185 spends 
less time trying to understand the application and what is claimed and 
more time determining patentability. 
The patent attorney's better understanding of what has been previously 
accomplished in a technical field also facilitates the drafting of fatent 
claims that avoid subject matter that is not novel or obvious. 18 This 
streamlines examination because unpatentable subject matter is weeded 
out prior to filing. The examiner does not waste time rejecting clearly 
invalid claims. 
The patent application also becomes more socially beneficial. A patent 
is not only meant to incentivize the creation of the invention; it is also 
meant to educate others and facilitate improvements and design-arounds 
of the claimed invention. 187 The doctrine causes the patent drafter to better 
understand the invention and be able to "talk the talk" technically. And the 
more technically-accurate and accessible the patent, the better it can fulfill 
these goals. The patent becomes like any other scientific reference materi-
al, explaining the subject matter in a way that is comprehensible to its in-
tended audience. 188 
185. See Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (indicating that examiners "are assumed to have some expertise in interpreting 
the references and to be familiar from their work with the level of skill in the art"). 
186. Patent attorneys routinely try to anticipate rejections by the USPTO when prose-
cuting patent applications in order to avoid them. See, e.g., Rajiv P. Patel et. a!., Under-
standing After Final and After Allowance Patent Practice, in ADVANCED PATENT PROSE-
CUTION WORKSHOP 2008: CLAIM DRAFTING & AMENDMENT WRITING, at 805, 836 (PLI 
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 14964, 
2008) ("With careful planning and analysis, an applicant can anticipate and address these 
rejections in one or more different manners -- and in some instances avoid such rejections 
altogether."). 
187. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) 
("[A ]fter the expiration of a federal patent, the subject matter of the patent passes to the 
free use of the public as a matter of federal law."); see also United States v. Dubilier 
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) ("An inventor deprives the public of nothing 
which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives something of value to the community by 
adding to the sum of human knowledge."); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 
F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called 
'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products, even when they are pa-
tented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace."). 
188. See Dorothy A. Winsor, Engineering Writing/Writing Engineering, 41 COLLEGE 
COMPOSITION & COMM. 58, 58 (1990) ("We talk, therefore, of language, and particularly 
written language, as a tool for constructing ideas, of a given field of knowledge being 
created by the interaction of its practitioners' texts, and of knowledge itself, including 
scientific knowledge, as rhetorically shaped."). 
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Gaining a better understanding of the invention also allows the patent 
attorney to draft claims that give the inventor and her company the neces-
sary "shelf space" so they can effectively commercialize the invention. 189 
Patent protection incentivizes invention because it gives the inventor an 
ability to recoup her research and development costs. 190 Patents do this by 
giving the patent holder the ability to exclude competitors and control 
price. 191 The less understanding the patent attorney has of the invention, 
the less likely she will draft claims that facilitate this purpose of patents 
and, in tum, are valuable to her client. Patenting is as much a business de-
cision as it is a legal one. By giving the patent attorney more information 
about the invention and its use prior to filing, the doctrine allows the pa-
tent application to better align with the invention's intended commercial 
use. 
2. Increases the Care Taken in Drafting the Application and 
Related Correspondence 
The doctrine also prompts the patent attorney to exercise more care in 
drafting the patent application and correspondence with the USPTO. The 
inequitable conduct doctrine penalizes applicants for misleading the USP-
TO with false statements in patent applications or other correspondence. 192 
The choice of a single word can make the difference between full disclo-
189. See Kitch, supra note 130, at 276-77; see also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 871 
(1990). 
190. Actually, it is the expectation of patent protection that provides the incentive. 
See Christopher A. Co tropia, "After-Arising" Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 
61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 169-71 (2005). 
191. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of 
Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1466-67 (2002). Parchomovsky and Siegel-
man state: 
[A]bsent legal protection, competitors would copy such works 
without incurring the initial costs of producing them .... [and, 
therefore,] [ u ]nauthorized reproduction would drive down the 
market price to the cost of copying, original authors and inventors 
would not be able to recover their expenditures on authorship and 
R&D, and, as a result, too few inventions and expressive works 
would be created." 
!d. at 1467. 
192. See Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(stating that "an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact" or "submitt[al of] false 
material information" can be inequitable conduct). 
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sure and misrepresentation. 193 As a result, patent attorneys are likely to 
exercise more care when drafting their communications with the USPTO. 
Patent attorneys ensure that everything discussed relevant to patentability 
is true and that nothing could be construed as a misrepresentation. This 
leads to a more accurate and readable public record, multiplying the bene-
fits of a high quality patent application discussed above. 
The current intent standard dampens the level of care required by the 
doctrine, however. The patent attorney must specifically intend to make a 
false statement or mislead the patent examiner; gross negligence is not 
enough. 194 However, misrepresentations are still considered material un-
der inequitable conduct. Their appearance in an application or response to 
an office action will likely prompt at least an allegation of inequitable 
conduct. This potential exposure at least affects the behavior of some pa-
tent attorneys, making them more careful in what they write. 195 
IV. CURRENT INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DOCTRINE 
RESULTS IN OVERCOMPLIANCE 
The inequitable conduct doctrine can only increase patent quality 
through compliance by patent applicants. The doctrine does this, like most 
other legal doctrines, by imposing certain legal and extra-legal costs on 
those who do not comply. In their current form, however, these costs are 
extremely high and instead of causing compliance, they prompt overcom-
pliance. 
193. See Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (finding material the use of the word "discovery" to characterize the invention 
while it was merely an "insight"-no test had actually been performed). 
194. See Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872-73 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (en bane). 
195. See, e.g., Stephen K. Sullivan, Drafting a Biotechnology Patent Specification, in 
16TH ANNUAL ADVANCED PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP: CLAIM DRAFTING & 
AMENDMENT WRITING, at 135, 145 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary 
Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 9100, 2006) (instructing that, in light of Hoffman-La 
Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which found 
inequitable conduct "where prophetic examples were presented in the past tense, as if 
they had actually been performed," an attorney should "[b ]e careful with word tense"). 
While it is true that inequitable conduct is likely to be alleged regardless of the patent 
attorney's actions, being more careful will have an impact on the number of false posi-
tives-improper findings of inequitable conduct. 
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Failure to comply with the doctrine renders the whole patent and, po-
tentially, related patents, unenforceable. 196 A finding of inequitable con-
duct also exrsoses the patentholder to antitrust liability and liability for at-
torney fees. 97 The doctrine imposes specific costs on the patent attorney 
too, ranging from disciplinary action from the USPTO and the applicable 
state bar to malpractice liability to irreparable damage to the attorney's 
reputation. 198 All these costs are high in absolute terms and become even 
greater when compared to the low costs of overcompliance-simply sub-
mitting all information in one's possession to the USPTO, regardless of its 
materiality. This dramatic cost differential combined with uncertainty in-
herent in the inequitable conduct doctrine leads to overcompliance. This 
line of analysis is explored in detail below. 
A. Breadth of Remedies Makes Non-Compliance Extremely 
Costly 
Initiating a patent lawsuit exposes the patent holder to a range ofliabil-
ities. The patentee may, if unsuccessful, be saddled with the other side's 
attorney fees under the fee-shifting statute. 199 More significantly, the pa-
tentee may lose any of the asserted patent claims if they are found to be 
invalid. A final judgment of invalidity prevents the patentee from success-
fully asserting the now invalid claim against other infringers. 200 Thus, by 
asserting particular patent claims in a given lawsuit, the patentee is putting 
those claims at risk. 201 Patentees have to weigh the potential benefits of 
196. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[T]he penalty for inequitable conduct is so severe, the loss of the entire 
patent even where every claim clearly meets every requirement of patentability."). 
197. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chern. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 
177 (1965) (discussing antitrust liability for asserting a patent procured through inequita-
ble conduct); Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (concluding that a finding of inequitable conduct results in an "exceptional" 
case, resulting in an award of attorney fees). 
198. See Kelly Merkel, How to Stump a Corporate Lawyer: Means of Effective Legal 
Risk Management for !P Counsel, 1 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 1, 3 (2006) ("A finding 
of inequitable conduct can therefore open the door for suits by the client against the prac-
titioner for breach of fiduciary duty and malpractice, even years after prosecution has 
ended."). 
199. See 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (awarding the "prevailing party" attorney fees in 
"exceptional cases"). 
200. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of III. Found., 402 U.S. 313,330-31 
( 1971) (holding that once the claims of a patent are held invalid, the patent holder is col-
laterally estopped from enforcing the claim against another party). 
201. See Cardinal Chern. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 102-D3 (1993) (in-
structing courts to rule on invalidity regardless of the outcome on infringement). 
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enforcing their patent-monetary damages and an injunction202-with the 
risk of losing patent claims and paying attorney fees. A patentee may pay 
for high cost litigation with nothing to show for it-no finding of in-
fringement or remedies because the patent is adjudged unenforceable. 203 
As compared to invalidity, the inequitable conduct doctrine places the 
patent holder in far less control over the downside of enforcing a patent 
claim. Invalidity affects only those asserted patent claims. 204 If a patentee 
does not want to risk the value in a particular claim, she simply does not 
assert it. Inequitable conduct, in contrast, causes the assertion of a single 
patent claim to expose the whole ~atent, and potentially all related patents, 
to a finding of unenforceability. 2 5 Sure, she still has control on a broader 
level as to what patent families are exposed. But her control is not nearly 
as fine as compared to her ability to cabin the impact of invalidity. 
The costs resulting from a finding of inequitable conduct also include 
liability for attorney fees and exposure to antitrust liability. The patent sta-
tutes give courts the ability to award a successful party its attorney fees if 
the case is "exceptional."206 A finding of inequitable conduct typically 
makes the case exceptionat2°7 and results in a fee award, which can reach 
202. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2006). 
203. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, AIPLA REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 1-90 (2007) [hereinafter AIPLA REPORT] (reporting that average cost taking a 
patent infringement case with less than one million dollars at risk through discovery be-
ing $461 ,000). 
204. See DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 
F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (noting that invalidity is determined on a "claim-by-
claim basis"). 
205. Fox Indus., Inc. v. Structural Pres. Sys., Inc., 922 F.2d 801, 803-804 (Fed. Cir. 
1990) (stating that inequitable conduct "may render unenforceable all claims which even-
tually issue from the same or a related application"); see also Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. 
Foseco lnt'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 812 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding that the inequitable conduct 
during prosecution of one patent "permeated the prosecution of the other" patents-in-
suit). Under certain circumstances, inequitable conduct will not spread. See, e.g., Baxter 
Int'l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The court in Baxter 
stated: 
[W]here the claims are subsequently separated from those tainted by 
inequitable conduct through a divisional application, and where the 
issued claims have no relation to the omitted prior art, the patent issued 
from the divisional application will not also be unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct committed in the parent application. 
!d. at 1332. 
206. 35 u.s.c. § 285 (2006). 
207. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) ("The prevailing party may prove the existence of an exceptional case by 
showing: inequitable conduct before the PTO .... "). 
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well into the seven figure range. 208 The assertion of a patent obtained by 
inequitable conduct may also be subject to antitrust liability. 209 "If a paten-
tee asserts a patent claim and the defendant can demonstrate the required 
fraud on the PTO, as well as show that 'the other elements necessary to a 
[Sherman Act] § 2 case are present,' the defendant-counterclaimant is en-
titled to treble damages under the antitrust laws."210 
B. Doctrine's Specific Impact on Patent Attorneys Makes Non-
Compliance Even More Costly 
A finding of inequitable conduct does not directly result in personal 
liability for the patent attorney. 211 Nor does such a finding necessarily in-
clude a factual holding that the patent attorney was at fault. 212 Inequitable 
conduct can occur where the attorney disclosed all she knew, but one of 
the other parties under the duty intentionally failed to come forward with 
material information. 213 
However, the patent attorney is invariably at the center of any inequit-
able conduct inquiry. The patent attorney acts as the hub for the informa-
tion flow from inventor and related parties to the USPTO. She assists in 
drafting the patent application and correspondence with the examiner. She 
typically signs all correspondence with the USPT0. 214 Her name also ap-
pears on the front of the issued patent. 215 Finally, the patent attorney is the 
one who best understands the legal obligations set forth by the inequitable 
conduct doctrine and usually communicates these obligations to the other 
relevant parties. So any non-disclosure, even if not her fault, has the patent 
attorney's fingerprints on it. As a result, the patent attorney is usually the 
first person noticed for deposition on the inequitable conduct issue and 
almost always mentioned by name in any inequitable conduct decision. 216 
208. See AIPLA REPORT, supra note 203, at 1-93. 
209. See Dippin' Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
210. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chern. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-
77 (1965). 
211. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that the focus of the doctrine is rendering the patent at 
issue unenforceable). 
212. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (a), (c) (2008) (detailing the various individuals beyond the 
attorney who are under a duty to disclose). 
213. See id. 
214. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.34 (2008). 
215. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.51(c)(v) (2008). 
216. See, e.g., McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 
903 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (referring to the prosecuting attorney by first and last name); Golden 
Hour Data Sys., Inc. v. emsCharts, Inc., No. 2:06 CV 381, 2009 WL 781334, *2 (E.D. 
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The doctrine truly puts "the person on trial, not the patent," and that per-
son is the patent attorney. 217 
The doctrine can result in personal legal costs for the patent attorney 
involved. A failure to comply with doctrine can form the basis for a dis-
ciplinary action before the USPT0. 218 The patent attorney can also lose 
her license to practice before the USPTO. 219 The matter may be referred to 
her state bar, where the patent attorney may be disciplined or even lose her 
general license to practice law. 220 A judgment of inequitable conduct can 
also form the basis of a malpractice claim. 221 
The personal costs can also be extra-legal. Allegations of inequitable 
conduct implicate a patent attorney's professionalism and reputation in the 
legal community at large and before the USPTO, where she is a repeat 
player. 222 This reputation and personal liability exposure are so important 
to patent attorneys that some have even moved to personally intervene in 
inequitable conduct cases. Recently, in Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys-
tems, Inc., a patent attorney who prosecuted the patent at issue filed a mo-
tion to intervene in the patent infringement litigation and asked the district 
court to reconsider the conclusion of inequitable conduct. 223 He specifical-
ly challenged the court's "characteriz[ ation] of his behavior in the court of 
the prosecution as constituting inequitable conduct."224 
Tex. Mar. 23, 2009) (identifying both the prosecuting patent agent and supervising attor-
ney by name). 
217. Chisum, supra note 9, at 279; see also Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar 
Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the "allegation of inequitable conduct opens new avenues of discovery" targeted at the 
patent attorney, not the patent). 
218. See Edwin S. Flores & Sanford E. Warren, Jr., Inequitable Conduct, Fraud, and 
Your License to Practice Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 8 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299,314-15 (2000). 
219. /d. 
220. Cf id. 
221. See David Hricik, How Things Snowball: The Ethical Responsibilities and Lia-
bility Risks Arising from Representing a Single Client in Multiple Patent-Related Repre-
sentations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421,459 (2005). 
222. See Migliorini, supra note 120, at 260 ("No client is worth the risk to one's per-
sonal integrity, reputation, and license to practice before the Bar" by committing inequit-
able conduct); see also Aventis, 525 F.3d at 1349-50 (Rader, J., dissenting) (indicating 
how allegations of inequitable conduct "impugns the integrity of the patentee, its counsel, 
and the patent itself'). 
223. 497 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
224. /d.atl318. 
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C. High Cost of Non-Compliance, Uncertainty in Court Decisions, 
and Low Cost of Overcompliance Results in Overcompliance 
Typically, law shapes behavior by making the costs of non-compliance 
outweigh any benefits. 225 Law relies on both legal and extra-legal costs to 
incentivize individual compliance. 226 As a result, rational, risk-neutral in-
dividuals do exactly what the legal rule requires to avoid engaging in be-
havior that is, on balance, detrimental to that individual. Applying this to 
the inequitable conduct doctrine, the doctrine uses certain legal and extra-
legal costs to prompt patent applicants to disclose material information to 
the USPTO. Rational, risk-neutral patent applicants therefore respond by 
disclosing material information. 227 
Legal rules almost always have some inherent ambiguity, either be-
cause the scope of the rules is uncertain, or because the likelihood of en-
forcement is not absolute. Individuals may not know ex ante exactly what 
they must do to comply with a given doctrine. Inequitable conduct is no 
different. It, like most patent doctrines, has some ambiguities. 228 Determi-
nations of whether a piece of information is material are difficult. 229 Mate-
riality is a multi-step inquiry, involving the determination of each patent 
claim's meaning, analysis of the content of the information in question, 
and a judgment as to whether the information is relevant to issues of nov-
elty, nonobviousness, or the disclosure requirements. 230 Whether the nee-
225. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Dam-
ages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1585, 1617-19 (1998) 
("In order to deter infringement, we must have a set of rules that renders an infringement 
unprofitable."). 
226. Legal costs are those costs, such as damage awards or injunctions that are im-
posed directly by the law-the remedial regime. Extra-legal costs are those costs, such as 
reputation or guilt, that do not derive directly from a statute or legal rule. 
227. If an applicant is risk-adverse, they will overcomply even if what is required for 
exact compliance is clear. If an applicant is risk-seeking, the opposite is true-
undercompliance. See James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 
VA. L. REv. 1641, 1651 (2008) (noting that while speed limits provide bright-line liabil-
ity rule, "[a] risk-averse driver will drive more slowly, and a risk-seeking driver will 
drive more quickly"). 
228. The focus is on the ambiguity of the rule, not its enforcement. The patent holder 
control its enforcement, opening herself up to such a defense when asserting her patent. 
229. See Alpa Gandhi, The Fate of the Rule 56 Materiality Standard in the Inequita-
ble-Conduct Inquiry, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 125, 127-28 (2005) (describing the uncertainty in 
the materiality standard). 
230. Even the first step of this process has been empirically proven to be incredibly 
uncertain. Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construc-
tion Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1097-99 (2001) (finding a 50% reversal rate 
for claim interpretations). 
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cessary subjective intent is present is often ambiguous, particularly given 
that intent is proven in court through circumstantial evidence. 231 An appli-
cant cannot predict with absolute certainty how a court will decide these 
requirements given their fact-dependency. 
Patent attorneys, and others under the duty to disclose, are faced with 
an array of choices as to how to comply. For example, what type of infor-
mation should they submit to the USPTO? And under what circumstances 
should they submit such information? They essentially must make a 
choice as to whether they err on the side of undercomplying or overcom-
plying--either of which, depending on the distribution of uncertainty 
around the legal rule, has a certain probability of avoiding liability. 232 Un-
dercompliance is typically chosen where there are, on net, substantial ben-
efits to undercompliance that outweigh the risk and impact of being found 
liable. 233 In contrast, an individual chooses to overcomply where the costs 
of overcompliance are small compared to the costs of being found lia-
ble. 234 
As previously discussed, the inequitable conduct doctrine makes a 
finding of non-compliance extremely costly. 235 The doctrine extracts both 
legal and extra-legal costs on both the patent holder and the patent attor-
ney. In comparison, the costs associated with overcompliance are minimal. 
The most common method of overcomplying under the current legal re-
gime is to submit everything of even remote relevance in one's possession 
to the USPTO. 236 Even if the information is not material to the claimed 
invention, disclosure absolves any potential violation of the doctrine. 237 
231. See D. Ward Hobson Jr., Refonning the Patent System: A Closer Look at Pro-
posed Legislation, 3 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 29 (2006). 
232. John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 971-74 (1984) (demonstrating the different 
distribution of uncertainty and describing the possible causes of over and undercom-
pliance). 
233. !d. at 981. 
234. !d. at 981-82. 
235. See supra Part IV. 
236. See Thomas, supra note 17, at 315 ("Where the applicant is already well in-
formed of the prior art, the specter of inequitable conduct too often causes applicants to 
submit virtually every reference of which they are aware."). 
237. Moreover, the disclosure of non-material or cumulative references imposes no 
penalty on the disclosing party. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1184 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (burying a material reference in a voluminous submission of information 
is not actionable unless there is specific intent to hide the reference). 
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The common mantra is "when in doubt, disclose."238 Even Federal Circuit 
case law, particularly recent case law, gives this advice. 239 
But every quanta of information submitted has its costs. The patent 
applicant must submit an IDS with the information, which must include a 
listing of each reference being submitted and identify for each reference, 
where relevant, the "publisher, author (if any), title, relevant pages of the 
publication, date, and place of publication." 40 The applicant is also re-
quired to submit a legible copy of any reference that is not another U.S. 
patent or published U.S. patent application. 241 If the applicant needs to 
disclose a piece of art that is in a foreign language, the applicant must also 
submit a "concise explanation of the relevance" of the foreign language 
reference. 242 Depending on the timing of the information's discovery, the 
applicant may have to pay the fees associated with continuing prosecution 
to allow the examiner to consider the newly submitted information. 243 
These costs, however, are minuscule compared to losing the enforcea-
bility of a valid patent, or possibly a whole family of valid patents. And 
when viewed from the patent attorney's perspective, overcompliance 
looks even more inviting. The patent attorney, while getting some satisfac-
tion (and presumably repeat business) from successfully obtaining a pa-
tent, obtains no personal gain from the issuance of the patent. In contrast, 
she has significant concerns that getting caught up in an inequitable con-
duct claim will damage her livelihood. Added to this is the fact that over-
compliance generates more legal fees. The attorney gets to charge her 
client for the time required to submit the additional information and con-
tinue prosecution if necessary. So, even if overcompliance becomes mar-
238. See Thomas C. Fiala & Jon E. Wright, Preparing and Prosecuting a Patent That 
Holds Up in Litigation, in PATENT LITIGATION 2006, at 515, 54 7 (PLI Patents, Copy-
rights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 9001, 2006) ("If it is 
unclear whether information is prior art, whether it is 'material', or whether it is cumula-
tive to information already submitted to the USPTO, the information should be disclosed 
so that the examiner can make the determination."). 
239. See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stat-
ing that an applicant must have a "credible good faith explanation for the withholding"); 
Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (noting that doubts concerning whether the information is material should be re-
solved in favor of disclosure). 
240. 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2008). 
241. § 1.98(2). 
242. § l.98(3)(i). 
243. The costs for filing a continuation in these instances, called a Request for Con-
tinued Examination ("RCE"), includes a filing fee and accompanying attorney billable 
hours to put the filing together. See 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.98; 37 C.F.R. 
§ l.ll4 (2008). 
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ginally expensive, patent attorneys may still push clients to overcomply 
because of their self-interest in such a course of action. 
V. OVERCOMPLIANCE CAUSED BY THE INEQUITABLE 
CONDUCT DOCTRINE REDUCES PATENT QUALITY 
Overcompliance puts any improvement in patent quality created by the 
inequitable conduct doctrine at risk. It overloads the examiner with infor-
mation that, in most instances, is immaterial. The examiner, with an ex-
tremely small amount of time to examine highly technical subject matter, 
does not process all of the submitted information or ignores it altogether, 
erasing any quality gains. In fact, the doctrine may end up doing more 
harm than good. Overcompliance can so stress the examiner as to impair 
her ability to make a sound decision based on the information she does 
process. Overcompliance further prices inventors out of the patent system, 
causing its own set of societal harms. These harms from overcompliance 
are discussed below. 
A. Overcompliance Causes Detrimental Information Overload 
The inequitable conduct doctrine is focused on getting quality infor-
mation before the USPTO. The doctrine requires only material informa-
tion be submitted. The patent applicant is not required to submit "informa-
tion which is not material to the patentability of any existing claim."244 
The doctrine places no weight on the quantity of information placed be-
fore the patent examiner. In fact, the doctrine invites the applicant to thin 
her submissions by not requiring the submittal of cumulative informa-
tion. 245 
However, as established above, the doctrine incentivizes the patent ap-
plicant to err on the side of quantity. 246 Applicants make the safe play and 
overcomply. They disclose all of the information within their possession 
that is remotely relevant to the claimed subject matter. The doctrine, there-
fore, causes examiners to receive additional quantities of information that 
are increasingly immaterial to the task at hand-determining patentability. 
The patent examiner, with this additional information generated by 
overcompliance, can experience information overload. Information over-
load occurs when a decision-maker cannot naturally process the informa-
tion in their possession in an allotted time without a high likelihood of 
244. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2008). 
245. See supra Section II.B. 
246. See supra Part IV. 
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making mistakes. 247 The chances of overload are rarticularly high when 
the information is highly technical or complex. 24 Examiners are over-
worked, with an increasing number of patent applications to examine in an 
ever-decreasing amount of time. 249 And the information they must 
process-the application and prior art-is technical by definition. Adding 
information submitted by the applicant to the mix, particularly large 
amounts of information from those who overcomply, plays a significant 
part in overloading the examiner. 250 
Information overload can negate any benefit in patent quality gained 
by the inequitable conduct doctrine. When overloaded, an individual has 
difficulty identifying information relevant to the decision-making task at 
hand. 251 An individual may overlook the most critical information. 252 The 
overloaded examiner must choose where to allocate her finite examining 
time. She may have to choose which of the submitted references she will 
read. 253 In the overload situation, the submitted information becomes in-
creasingly immaterial, meaning the examiner will waste at least some of 
her time reading non-material information. 254 The bigger the haystack, the 
more lost a needle becomes. 
Information overload can even cause the examiner to become so over-
whelmed that she does not even attempt to sift through the applicant's 
submissions. 255 She ignores them completely. The benefits of the addi-
tional, relevant information the doctrine generates are lost in the sea of 
information. 
247. Naresh K. Malhotra, Reflections on the Information Overload Paradigm in Con-
sumer Decision Making, 10 J. CONSUMER RES. 436,437 (1984). 
248. See S.C. Schneider, Information Overload: Causes and Consequences, 7 HU-
MAN SYS. MGMT. 143, 144 (1987). 
249. See supra Section III.A.l. 
250. See, e.g., Noveck, supra note 140, at 148-49 (noting that successful examination 
reforms need to include mechanism to prevent "overwhelming the patent examiner with 
information"). 
251. See Paul A. Herbig & Hugh Kramer, The Effect of Information Overload on the 
Innovation Choice Process, 11 J. OF CONSUMER MARKETING 45, 45 (1994). 
252. !d. 
253. See Thomas, supra note 17, at 315 ("Coupled with the severe time constraints 
facing the examining corps, this overload of information often allows no more than a 
cursory review of all but a few references that initially appear the most promising."). 
254. The concept that examiners have a definite saturation point is further supported 
by recent empirical research that found the likelihood of receiving a rejection plateaus at 
twenty references. See Crouch, supra note 164 (finding the percentage likelihood hover-
ing around 40% once twenty references is reached). 
255. !d. 
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The harm from information overload can go beyond wiping out the 
doctrine's quality gains. In an attempt to process all of the information, the 
examiner simplifies her processing strategy. 256 This results in poorer deci-
sions because fidelity is lost across the board-none of the information is 
properly processed. 257 She loses her ability to identify the relationship be-
tween details and her overall perspective on the decision at hand. 25 She 
becomes stressed, confused, and generally cognitively strained, impairing 
her ability to think analytically. 259 More becomes less. 
Empirical studies indicate that this analysis holds true even if the addi-
tional information is as material as that already submitted. 260 That is, the 
increase in quantity still overwhelms the decision-maker even if the addi-
tional information is of high quality. The materiality of the additional in-
formation is irrelevant to the information overload scenario. The over-
whelming volume of the information degrades the examiner's ability to 
reach a proper decision. 
B. Results in Socially-Wasteful Costs 
As previously stated, the costs of overcompliance are small when 
compared to the costs of being found non-compliant. To the patentee and 
the attorney, spending a few thousand dollars, even tens of thousands of 
dollars, and delaying the issuance of the patent is miniscule compared to 
losing a full family of patents, paying attorney fees, facing exposure to 
antitrust liability, risking possible bar discipline, and so on. However, this 
is the private, internal cost-benefit analysis. 
The answer to the question of costs is very different when looked at in 
terms of the big picture. That is, is this spending beneficial to the public? 
The answer is no, given that overcompliance artificially increases the price 
of patent procurement, and the extra dollars spent going beyond what is 
required under the inequitable conduct doctrine add nothing to the quality 
of the patent examination. In fact, as discussed above, the submission of 
additional information, particularly immaterial information, actually ham-
256. See Naresh K. Malhotra, Information Load and Consumer Decision Making, 8 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 419, 427 (1982) (noting that information overload causes individuals to 
"adopt simplifying information-processing strategies"). 
257. See Kevin Lane Keller & Richard Staelin, Effects of Quality and Quantity of In-
formation on Decision Effectiveness, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 200, 212 (1987) (concluding 
that overload "degrade[s] choice accuracy"). 
258. See Schneider, supra note 248, at 145. 
259. See Malhotra, supra note 256, at 427. 
260. See Keller & Staelin, supra note 257, at 212. 
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pers the examination process by creating information overload. 261 Over-
compliance is socially wasteful spending. 
These additional costs can also create another harm-pricing out po-
tential patentees. The costs of compliance are not significant. In most cas-
es, they may constitute, at most, one percent of the total cost of obtaining a 
patent. 262 However, price tolerances for patenting can be extremely sensi-
tive, especially for individual inventors or small companies. 263 Each in-
crease in the cost of patenting can deter these would-be inventors from 
inventing altogether, or, prompt them to choose trade secret protection in 
lieu of patenting. 264 Both of these options are disadvantageous, possibly 
robbing society of the next great invention or hiding the details of that in-
vention from the general public. 
One option for these individuals, for which compliance is too costly, is 
to undercomply. 265 But given that the patent attorney has significant indi-
vidual interests at stake, the attorney is unlikely to play along. In fact, the 
professional advice to patent attorneys is to "avoid being pressured by 
clients to compromise [their] ethical duties."266 Furthermore, the cost of 
compliance with the doctrine is likely not transparent to the cost-sensitive 
applicant. The cost is simply included in initial quote for the cost of get-
ting a patent. The small inventor has no practical choice to forgo com-
pliance. 
VI. USING THIS FRAMEWORK TO REFORM THE 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT DOCTRINE 
The benefits of constructing a modern framework for the inequitable 
conduct doctrine are two-fold. First, the framework identifies ways in 
which the doctrine can be beneficial and detrimental. From there, reforms 
can be targeted, attempting to maximize the positive aspects of the doc-
trine and minimize the negative ones. Second, the framework provides a 
workable model upon which current concerns and suggested reforms can 
be vetted. And given that the framework established is utilitarian based, it 
261. See supra Section V.A. 
262. See AIPLA REPORT, supra note 203, at 1-78 (finding the average cost of obtain-
ing a patent between $6,600-$15,000). 
263. Patent law has recognized this fact, establishing a separate fee schedule for 
"small entit[ies]." See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § l.16(a) (2008) (setting forth lesser filing fees for 
small entities). 
264. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 143, at 236-37 (recognizing that increasing the 
costs of prosecution "decreases the incentives produced by the patent system"). 
265. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 232, at 981-82. 
266. Migliorini, supra note 120, at 260. 
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is much easier to address recent criticisms, which all have a utilitarian 
bent. 
This Part uses the analysis previously performed to do both of these 
things. Reforms are initially suggested to remedy the overcompliance cur-
rently provoked by the doctrine. The extent of the remedies for violating 
the doctrine needs to be reduced, a specific intent standard separate from 
materiality must be maintained, and the submission of immaterial and cu-
mulative information discouraged. The positive aspects of the doctrine 
should, however, not be lost, and so, the materiality standard must remain 
broad. 
Next, the Article's framework is applied to the two most common crit-
icisms regarding the doctrine. The duties under the doctrine should not be 
expanded to include a duty to search or provide relevancy statements. 
Such duties are likely to overload the examiner, price inventors out of the 
patent system, shift the burdens of examination away from a low cost pro-
vider, and destroy the benefits of independent review. Finally, if the re-
forms proposed in this Part are adopted, a reduction in litigation costs fol-
lows. Thus, there is no need for any specific reforms to address this per-
ceived problem. 
A. Reducing the Likelihood of Overcompliance 
The cost of non-compliance can be reduced, the ambiguity surround-
ing the doctrine can be minimized, or the costs of overcompliance can be 
increased. All three options are suggested below. 
1. Minimize the Remedy 
The current remedy is incredibly severe-truly an "atomic bomb."267 
One way of reducing the amount of over compensation is to minimize the 
costs associated with non-compliance. It is the high cost of not complying 
that, in part, drives applicants to overcomply. 268 The question is to what 
extent should the costs of non-compliance be reduced. How far should the 
available legal remedies and associated legal and extra-legal costs be 
reigned in? 
A good place to start is to tie the legal remedy with the harm non-
disclosure does to patent quality. Failure to disclose material information 
hampers the examination of those patent claims to which the material is 
relevant. 269 The remedy should be adjusted accordingly. No longer should 
267. Aventis Phanna S.A. v. Amphastar Phann., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
268. See supra Part IV. 
269. See supra Part III. 
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a finding of inequitable conduct render the whole patent, and possibly re-
lated patents, unenforceable. The remedy should mimic a finding of inva-
lidity-only those claims to which the undisclosed information is material 
should be rendered unenforceable. The patent holder can then control her 
exposure by subjecting only asserted claims to a finding ofunenforceabili-
ty. 
The legal remedies could be reduced further, taking the form of a 
monetary remedy, for example. A finding of inequitable conduct could 
result in a fine or the damage award for infringement could be reduced. 
The problem with swinging this far in the other direction is that, by taking 
the patent out of harms way, the applicant may undercomply. The fine or 
potential reduction in damages could simply be folded in with the cost of 
enforcing the patent. And to make monetary damages effective, the 
amount would have to be adjusted in light of the potential upside-
monetary and injunctive remedies-to the patent holder benefiting from 
successful enforcement. This introduces uncertainty into the remedy re-
gime, which makes it even more difficult to predict the extent to which 
applicants will comply. 270 Adjusting the monetary remedy is an imperfect 
way of getting at the patent's value to the patent holder. If that is the goal, 
the simple solution is to find the asserted claims unenforceable. 
A final possible remedy is to give district courts the discretion in de-
termining the remedy. 271 The court can vary the equitable relief according-
ly, from finding the whole family of patents unenforceable to denying in-
junctive relief. Discretion allows the district court to fine-tune the remedy 
to the facts of a particular case. But ex ante, when the applicant is trying to 
determine how to comply, the applicant has no idea what remedy a judge 
will choose. This introduces uncertainties of its own, which increases the 
variation in the levels of compliance. Furthermore, if the extreme remedy 
is still in play-unenforceability of a group of patents-rational applicants 
are still likely to overcomply. 
2. Maintain a Specific, Independent Standard for Intent 
The high costs unique to the patent attorney-potential disbarment, 
malpractice liability, and damage to reputation-may cause overcom-
pliance to continue even if the remedies are reduced. The best way to re-
duce these attorney-specific costs is not through just changing the costs of 
non-compliance, but reducing the uncertainty in the doctrine, particularly 
as it pertains to the attorney. As the target-how to comply with the doc-
270. Cf Calfee & Craswell, supra note 232, at 971-72. 
271. This change was proposed in the 2007 Patent Reform Act. See Patent Reform 
Act of2007, H.R. 1908, llOth Cong. § 12(c)(4) (2007). 
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trine-becomes clearer, it becomes easier for patent applicants, and their 
h . 1 1" 272 attorneys, to tune t e1r response to actua comp 1ance. 
The intent requirement in the inequitable conduct doctrine is the best 
candidate to reduce ambiguity. The materiality requirement is too complex 
for any reforms to provide much certainty because the standard for mate-
riality and the underlying concept of patentability would need to be 
cleared up. 273 Intent, in contrast, is a familiar doctrine, common across 
multiple legal fields. The clearer the standard of intent under the inequita-
ble conduct doctrine ex ante, the easier it will be for patent attorneys to 
feel confident that they will be found in compliance. 
The "bleed through" from the materiality finding is responsible for 
most of the intent doctrine's current ambiguity. The recent conflict at the 
Federal Circuit over the intent requirement is evidence of this ambigui-
ty. 274 A finding of high materiality-the information was very material to 
patentability-is used as conclusive circumstantial evidence that the appli-
cant intended to deceive the patent examiner. 275 This type of analysis re-
duces the inequitable conduct inquiry into nothing more than a determina-
tion of materiality. It also makes it difficult for applicants, and their attor-
neys, to be confident that they are free from liability if they actually be-
lieve something is not material or if they unintentionally overlook infor-
mation in their possession. Even if these facts are true, and they did not 
intend to deceive the USPTO, inequitable conduct will likely be found be-
cause of bleed through. 
272. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 232, at 971 (showing how the distribution of 
possible responses grows narrower as certainty reduces, minimizes the magnitude of 
possible overcompliance). 
273. For example, the standard for nonobviousness is very unclear after the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in KSR. See Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent 
Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 39, 53-54 (2008). 
274. Compare Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 
1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that inferences of intent should go in the favor of the 
applicant and no finding of inequitable conduct), with Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 543 
F.3d 1306, 1313-14 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that it's the applicant's burden to rebut 
an inference of intent with affirmative, credible evidence of good faith). 
Judge Linn, in a recent concurrence, called for an en bane review of the intent standard 
in order to clarify the standard and identify acceptable evidence to prove intent. See Lar-
son Mfg., 2009 WL 691322, at *20. 
275. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Endo Pharm. Inc., 438 F.3d 1123, 1133-35 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) ("[A] patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it knew or 
should have known of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish 'subjec-
tive good faith' sufficient to prevent the drawing of an inference of intent to mislead.") 
(quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1257 
(Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
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This ambiguity leads to overcompliance. Applicants second-guess 
themselves, submitting information even if they personally believe the in-
formation is not material. 
To resolve this ambiguity and make the lack of intent a true safe ha-
ven, a specific intent standard that is distinct from materiality needs to be 
adopted. The 2007 Patent Reform Act contained such a provision. 276 With 
such a requirement, patent applicants, and particularly attorneys, can better 
tailor their conduct to meet the doctrine's requirements. If they do not in-
tend to deceive the USPTO-they truly believe that undisclosed informa-
tion is not material, for example-they can be pretty sure they will not be 
found liable. 
This solution does not create absolute certainty. Circumstantial evi-
dence is still available to establish intent, and it should be. If the doctrine 
required direct evidence, it would be near impossible to establish inequita-
ble conduct, resulting in massive undercompliance. 277 However, removing 
the ability of accused infringers to piggyback an intent finding based on 
materiality still reduces a significant amount of the ambiguity in the doc-
trine. 278 The more certain a path towards compliance, the less one over-
complies. Establishing a truly independent intent standard goes a long way 
in providing that certainty. 
3. Prohibit the Submission of Cumulative and Non-Material Art 
Even with a reduction in costs and a clearer legal standard, the incen-
tive to overcomply likely remains. This incentive does not come solely 
from fear of the costs of non-compliance. Instead, it is also driven by the 
fact that overcompliance-submitting all information in the applicant's 
possession without reviewing for materiality-can still be the cheapest 
way to comply. Reading and evaluating a reference is the most attorney 
intensive, and thus expensive, part of submitting information to the USP-
TO. Thus, even if costs of non-compliance are reduced, applicants may 
still overcomply because it is the least costly type of compliance. Informa-
tion overload, therefore, continues. 
276. See H.R. 1908 § 5( c )(3) (2007) ("[S]pecific facts beyond materiality of the in-
formation misrepresented or not disclosed must be proven that establish the intent of the 
person to mislead or deceive the examiner by the actions of that person."). 
277. See HotTman-La Roche Inc. v. Lemmon Co., 906 F.2d 684, 688 (Fed. Cir. 1990) 
("[I]ntent usually can only be found as a matter of inference from circumstantial evi-
dence."). 
278. Adoption of a presumption of no intent and the resolution of multiple inferences 
in favor of a finding of no intent is a move in the right direction. The Federal Circuit's 
recent articulation of the intent standard in Star Scientific follows such an approach. See 
Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366-67. 
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Currently, an applicant who overloads the USPTO with immaterial or 
cumulative information does not commit inequitable conduct. 279 Even if 
the large volume of submissions effectively "buries" a particularly materi-
al reference, the applicant does not per se commit inequitable conduct. 280 
Some district courts have used such activity as circumstantial evidence of 
intent. 281 But none, yet, have gone any further. 
The potential solution is two fold. First, the intentional submission of 
immaterial or cumulative information should be actionable under the doc-
trine. This addresses the most egregious overloaders-those who are truly 
trying to bury the examiner with information they know is irrelevant. This 
does not, however, address those who are simply grossly negligent in their 
submission methodology by not reading references, or barely reading 
them, and then submitting them. 
The second part of the solution is to actively enforce existing USPTO 
disciplinary rules that require applicants to read information before they 
submit it to the office. Rule 1 0.18(b )(2) requires patent attorneys to make 
an "inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" as to why a paper is sub-
mitted. 282 The rule requires the patent attorney to represent that "[ t ]he pa-
per is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
someone or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
prosecution before the [USPT0]."283 Failure to comply with this rule risks 
the validity of the patent and sanctions against the attorney. 284 If this rule 
were actively enforced, it would incentivize applicants to read information 
before submitting it, with an eye toward not overloading the USPTO. En-
forcement of this rule would temper the amount of low-cost overcom-
pliance. 285 
279. See supra notes 226-227. 
280. See Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting 
that the court must assume the examiner considered the submitted information). 
281. See, e.g., Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 948, 964-
65 (S.D. Fla. 1972). 
282. 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(b)(2) (2008). 
283. § 10.18(b)(2)(i). 
284. 37 C.F.R. § 10.18(c) (2008). 
285. The pending IDS rules, which require the filing of an Examination Support Doc-
trine ("EDS") if more then a particular number of pieces of prior art is filed is another 
possible avenue of reducing overcompliance. See Changes To Information Disclosure 
Statement Requirements and Other Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 (July 10, 2006) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). The ESD requires the applicant to identify the relev-
ance of the submitted art to the pending claims, and the cost of such a doctrine arguably 
deters the oversubmission of art. However, this limitation is, in a sense, random, tied to a 
particular number. The "proper" number of references to submit varies with the technol-
ogical area and the type of art in the applicant's possession in relationship to the claims. 
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B. Maintaining an Independent and Broad Materiality Standard 
The inequitable conduct doctrine needs to maintain its positive effects 
on patent quality as well. To do this, the standard for materiality must stay 
independent of the standard for invalidity. That is, "materiality" need not 
require that the withheld information actually render a claim invalid. 286 
Requiring the submission of information that establishes only a prima 
facie case of invalidity, but does not make a conclusive case, broadens the 
patent quality gains under the doctrine. This standard includes information 
that is extremely relevant to the patent examination, but still broad enough 
to create spillover benefits. The more information required to be submit-
ted, the larger the knowledge base of the ~atent attorney and greater the 
benefits from this increased knowledge. 28 This broad information base 
also increases the second-order information production benefits to exami-
nation. The examiner gets more information that may lead to additional 
relevant information or thinking that, in tum, produces a better examina-
tion. 288 However, this information base would not be so large and its rele-
vancy not so tenuous as to significantly increase the likelihood of informa-
tion overload. 
In addition, if materiality were limited to claim-invalidating informa-
tion, the inequitable conduct doctrine would become redundant during liti-
gation. A finding of inequitable conduct may have secondary, legal cost 
effects on the patent holder. But once the claim is found invalid, the dam-
age to that claim is done-the claim is no longer valid and thus cannot be 
enforced. 289 The value added by the doctrine is minimized greatly by 
equating the materiality standard with validity. 
C. Avoiding Expansion of the Duties Governed by the Doctrine 
Some critics question whether the duties governed by the doctrine 
should be expanded to include a duty to search and provide relevancy 
statements about submitted information. The 2007 version of the patent 
reform legislation contained a provision that gives the USPTO authority to 
require an applicant to do a search and inform the USPTO as to how the 
There is no magical number of references where the cost benefit of providing them to the 
USPTO becomes negative. 
286. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 136(c)(2) 
(2005). 
287. See supra Section III.C.l. 
288. See supra Section III.B.l. 
289. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
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application is patentable in light of the search results. 290 The pending IDS 
rules proposed by the USPTO require relevancy statements in certain cir-
cumstances-again asking the applicant to link the submitted information 
to the application's claims. 291 
Expanding the applicant's duties to include either of these-searching 
or relevancy statements-would dramatically increase the cost of com-
pliance. To perform a search in-house or request a search from an outside 
firm costs between $2,000 to $3,500.292 Relevancy statements, which re-
quire the applicant to identify the relevant portions of the submitted in-
formation and distinguish the disclosed invention, are even more costly, 
ranging from $12,250 to $20,000.293 These costs become more significant 
when compared to the typical cost of patent prosecution; they dwarf the 
cost of preparing and filing a typical patent application, which ranges from 
$6,600 to $15,000. 294 The ambiguous nature of these duties-how many 
databases to search, whether the search needs to be updated if new infor-
mation is discovered during prosecution, whether new searches are re-
quired if the claims are amended-magnify these costs. 295 When the ten-
dency to overcomply because of the legal and extra-legal costs exacted by 
the inequitable conduct doctrine is added, the costs of expanded duties be-
come even higher. 
These high costs could temper the current environment of overcom-
pliance by making excessive disclosure cost-prohibitive. 296 This can re-
duce the problem of information overload. The additional duties can also 
magnify the patent quality effects of the inequitable conduct doctrine. The 
patent attorney would be exposed to more relevant information, making 
290. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, I lOth Cong. § 11 (2007). The 2009 
version of the legislation does not modify the inequitable conduct doctrine. See Patent 
Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, Ill th Cong. (2009). 
291. See Changes To Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Re-
lated Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,808. 
292. AIPLA REPORT, supra note 203, at 1-82. 
293. !d. at 1-83 (describing the costs for a validity opinion). Relevancy statements, 
like those proposed in§ 11 or 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808 are essentially requests for a validity 
opinion. That is, they ask the applicant to explain to the USPTO why the application pa-
tentable over the discovered information. 
294. /d. at 1-78. 
295. See Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 667-68 (E.D. Va. 2007) (noting the 
ambiguities inherent in such duties possibly rise to the level of being unconstitutionally 
vague). The Federal Circuit affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and remanded the district 
court's decision in Tafas, but specifically did not address the potentially vagueness of the 
rules. Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
296. See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 232, at 981-82. 
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her think more about the patentability of the application, and increasing 
the amount of quality information before the examiner. 
These gains are unlikely to be realized, however. First, even normal 
compliance with these additional duties is likely to overload the examiner. 
While these duties do provide a plethora of new information on the ex-
aminer, there is no mechanism to give her additional time to process it. 
The new information does not only come in the form of new references, 
but analysis by the patent applicant if relevancy statements are also re-
quired. 
The high costs of compliance will likely not cause the applicant to un-
dercomply with the doctrine. The patent attorney has a personal interest in 
complying that goes beyond a single client's interest in getting a patent at 
a low cost. Again, patent attorneys are advised to not "be[] pressured by 
clients to comprise [their] ethical duties."297 This means that applicants 
will be forced to pay the high fees to comply or forgo patenting altogether. 
By essentially doubling the cost of obtaining a patent, the expansion of 
duties may price potential inventors out of the system altogether, which 
either deters the formal invention process or pushes it outside the patent 
system and into the realm of trade secret. 298 
Finally, making the applicant essentially perform the examiner's job--
searching and textually analyzing patentability based on the search-is 
socially inefficient. Having applicants evaluate and produce information 
already in their possession makes sense because they are the lowest cost 
provider even if they are not good at analyzing patentability. 299 But, hav-
ing an applicant conduct searches, something in which she is not necessar-
ily an expert, is a poor use of resources. Searching, and in particular 
searching the invention's field of technology, is the examiner's profession. 
If more searching is required, the examiner is the one to do it. 
Maintaining. the independence and second-review benefits of examina-
tion is also a goal.-300 An examiner is unlikely to do more than verify the 
applicant's patentability analysis under these new expanded duties. New 
examiners will not have the opportunity to gain search skills in a patent 
system where searching is done by the applicant, and independent review 
becomes even more of a fallacy. 
297. See supra note 245. 
298. See supra note 243. 
299. See supra Section IILB.l. 
300. See, e.g., Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformi-
ty Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1627-37 (2007) (describing the benefits and dis-
advantages of decentralized decision making). 
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D. Reducing Litigation Costs as a Result of the Proposed Reforms 
A final concern regarding the doctrine that needs to be addressed is lit-
igation costs. Critics assert that the doctrine is alleged too often and too 
costly to litigate. 301 The reforms already mentioned, while not eliminating 
the litigation costs entirely, greatly reduce them. Thus, no additional 
reform is needed to address this problem. 
Most of the reforms aimed at reducing overcompliance also make the 
inequitable conduct defense less attractive to assert. The breadth of reme-
dies would be reduced, with only individual claims being exposed to unen-
forceability. Specific, independent evidence of intent would be required to 
prove inequitable conduct. Both of these changes weaken the doctrine, 
making it harder to prove and the rewards less tantalizing. This would de-
crease the rate of assertion. 
Declining to expand the duties under the doctrine would also keep liti-
gation costs down. The more theories of liability under the doctrine, the 
more opportunities for an alleged infringer to assert the defense of inequit-
able conduct. As the duties under the doctrine increase, the easier it be-
comes for a defendant to find at least one plausible theory of inequitable 
conduct. The defendant is also able to keep the claim alive longer during 
litigation. By keeping the duty focused on information within the appli-
cant's possession, the doctrine does not open up new doors through which 
the defense can be alleged. 
Some of the reforms could increase litigation costs. If materiality were 
tied to the question of validity, the doctrine would no longer be an inde-
pendent litigation tool. It would become infrequently litigated because of 
the need to prove invalidity as a predicate. So maintaining the distinction 
between materiality and validity does forgo one option for saving litiga-
tion costs. The addition of a theory of inequitable conduct based on inten-
tional submission of immaterial or cumulative information will likely 
spark some additional allegations of inequitable conduct. As the liability 
theories expand, so does the room for the doctrine's assertion. 
On net, however, these reforms would constrict the scope of the doc-
trine, thus litigation costs overall will decrease. In addition, this concern 
may not sit within the broader utilitarian goal of patent law. Gains in pa-
tent quality caused by the suggested reforms would likely outweigh the 
negative impact from the already high cost of litigating the doctrine. The 
breadth of positive impact is so much greater-affecting every patent and 
301. See supra Section II.C.2. 
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patent examination-than the small percentage of patents that are actually 
litigated. 302 
VII. CONCLUSION 
One of the most pressing questions in the U.S. patent system is how 
responsibilities should be shared between the inventor and the USPTO 
when examining a patent application. The inventor wants to externalize 
costs by burdening the USPTO with the majority of the work and the 
USPTO, similarly, wants the inventor to internalize as much of the costs 
as possible. The inequitable conduct doctrine, which governs the inven-
tor's duties during patent examination, sits at the center of this tension. 
The doctrine addresses when the applicant needs to assist in examination 
by providing information to the USPTO. The question has always been 
how much information needs to be provided. 
This Article exposes the complexity of this problem by constructing a 
conceptual framework by which to measure the inequitable conduct doc-
trine's impact on the patent system. The doctrine can have a very positive 
impact on the system, by improving patent quality, but can also have tre-
mendous negative impacts, by hindering examination and denying access 
to the incentive to invent. Knowing how the doctrine impacts the utilita-
rian goals of the patent system is crucial when determining how to tune 
the inequitable conduct doctrine. But understanding these dynamics tells 
even more about the patent application process and how examiners, appli-
cants, and potential inventors are impacted by shifts in the cost-sharing of 
patent examination. This fundamental understanding, and the specific re-
forms it suggests, can help not only improve the inequitable conduct doc-
trine, but also the entire patent system. 
302. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 
75, 75 (2005) (noting that only 1.5 % of issued patents are ever asserted and only 0.1% 
go to trial). 
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